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Chapter One  
Introduction  
 
1.1  Introduction and Background to the Topic of the Study  
"The ICC is here to address atrocious crimes committed against our fellow 
human beings. And it is our job to make sure that this is sound, meaningful 
justice that has a real impact in helping to restore and maintain a stable peace. 
…I would like to emphasize as well the importance of national systems for the 
effective operation of the International Criminal Court. The ICC is a court of last 
resort based on the premise that the primary responsibility for investigating and 
prosecuting serious crimes of international concern lies with states. National 
judges under the Rome Statute system continue to be the main torchbearers of 
justice and the rule of law. That is why the adoption of adequate implementing 
legislation by states that adhere to the Rome Statute is fundamental for the 
effective functioning of the system. Implementing legislation is crucial to promote 
national investigations and prosecutions, to ensure full cooperation with the 
Court‘s activities and to allow the enforcement by national courts of judicial 
orders and decisions of the ICC‖.1 
Ever since the process of decolonisation started, Africa has experienced a very 
tumultuous period, with widespread political unrest, civil wars and a multitude of 
insurgencies.2 In the post-election violence that erupted in Kenya after the 
presidential election that was held in December 2007, an estimated 1000 people 
died and almost 350 000 were displaced.3 Recently the flare-up of a new type of 
sectarian-based violence manifested in Boko Haram‟s deadliest attack ever: the 
massacre of an estimated 2000 people in the north-eastern village of Doron Baga in 
                                            
1
 Keynote speech by Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, President of the International Criminal 
Court at an event marking the “Day of International Criminal Justice”, The Hague, 26 June 2015. 
2
 In the aftermath of the Second World War, African states began to achieve independence from 
colonial rule by European states, however a report prepared by Dr Monty G Marshall, a research 
professor at the Centre for Global Policy at the George Mason University, for the Government of the 
United Kingdom‟s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) 2006, details the past and current armed 
conflicts in Africa, and the reasons for these conflicts /  Degomme O and Guha-Sapir D, “Patterns in 
mortality rates in Darfur” 2010 The Lancet, Volume 375, Number 9711, Pages 294-300, estimates 
that up to 2010, the cumulative death toll in the Darfur region is more than 178 363 people.  
3
 http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/fact_sheet.pdf  and 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Sudan_Weekly_Humanitarian_Bulletin_Is
sue_11_%287_-_13_March_2016%29.pdf (Accessed on 25 October 2017). 
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Nigeria.4 However, African countries are not the only states plagued by unrest. 
Countries like Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Colombia also experience high levels of armed 
conflict and insurgencies.  
The coming into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereafter referred to as the “Rome Statute”) was a truly great achievement for the 
international community, and especially for Africa.5 African states were on the 
forefront of pursuing the realisation of the International Criminal Court6 (hereafter 
referred to as the “ICC”), and this is reflected in the fact that African countries are the 
most represented of all the states that have acceded to the Rome Statute.7 
Punishing those responsible for the commission of war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity, first gained a foothold after the First World War, when the Treaty of 
Versailles made provision for the punishment of German officers for serious 
violations of the conduct of warfare.8 It was only after the conclusion of the Second 
World War, with the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals, that 
major war criminals were prosecuted by the Allies. However, the concept of 
complementarity was only adopted in the Genocide Convention of 1948 and 
                                            
4
 Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group based in north-eastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger 
and northern Cameroon.  
5
 The Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. This version of the Statute 
incorporates changes made to it by the procés-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 
November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force 
on 1 July 2002. 
6
 Article 1 of the Rome Statute. 
7
 Cole R.J.V “Africa‟s relationship with the International Criminal Court: More political than legal” 2013 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, Volume 14, Pages 671-698 / 124 countries are state parties 
to the Rome Statute, and of those countries 34 are African states, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/african%20states.aspx (Accessed 
on 31 March 2017).  
8
     Part VII, Article 227 of Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, states that ―The Allied and 
Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a 
supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. 
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential 
to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following 
Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
 
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to 
vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international 
morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. 
 
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for 
the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.‖ 
12 
 
thereafter, in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.9 Yet the first prosecution pursuant to 
these treaties was only initiated 45 years later in 1994, when the Bosnian-Serb 
concentration camp commander Dragan Nikolić was indicted by the newly created 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.10 
According to the Rome Statute the ICC may exercise its functions and powers on the 
territory of any state party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other 
state.11 The ICC has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community namely, the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the crime of aggression.12 
Any statute is only effective if it is enforced. The Rome Statute relies on two very 
important principles for its application: the first of these principles is that of 
complementarity and the second is cooperation by state parties.13 In the context of 
the Rome Statute, complementarity means that the national courts of the state 
parties have primary jurisdiction over international crimes and that the ICC is a court 
of last resort.14 Under the complementarity principle, therefore, it is the duty of every 
state party to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes. It implies that all state parties to the Rome Statute have a national criminal 
                                            
9
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 and the Four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
10
 Bothe M “Complementarity: Ensuring compliance with international law through criminal 
prosecutions, whose responsibility?” 2008, Die Friedens-Warte, Volume 83, Number 4, Pages 59-72 / 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia saw the prosecution and 
punishment of individuals for grave breaches of international humanitarian law during the Yugoslav 
wars / Goldstone R “Historical evolution from Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court” 2007 
Penn State University International Law Review, Vol. 25, Issue 4 (Spring 2007), Pages 763-778 
11
 Article 4 of the Rome Statute.  
12
 Articles 5,6,7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.  
13
 Complementarity is provided for in Article 1 of the Rome Statute read together with the Preamble. 
Cooperation is provided for in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. / Apreotesei A “The Principle of 
Complementarity and the International Criminal Court” 2008 Iustum Aequum Salutare 2008 Volume 4, 
Pages 93-120 / Kleffner J.K “The impact of complementarity on national implementation of 
substantive international criminal law” 2003 Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 1, Pages 
86-113 / Carter L.E “The future of the International criminal Court: Complementarity as a strength or a 
weakness?” 2013 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Volume 12, Pages 451-473 /  
14
 In this regard paragraph 10 of the preamble to the Rome Statute states that ‖the International 
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions‖ as well as Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute which states that ――…the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless 
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;…‖ 
13 
 
justice system in place to assert jurisdiction and to deal judicially with international 
crimes.15 There is no formal duty on a state party to prosecute a crime as provided 
for in the Rome Statute, and a party merely risks intervention by the ICC should they 
fail to investigate or prosecute such an offence.16 Nouwen states that there is no 
responsibility, obligation or even duty on state parties to investigate and prosecute 
crimes, and that the only provision in the Rome Statute that explicitly refers to a 
relevant duty is in the preamble to the Rome Statute, where it states that “it is the 
duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”.17 This was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in the matter of 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, where the court made 
two key findings.18 Firstly, the Appeals Chamber stated that under Article 17(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute the question of unwillingness or inability by a state to act 
only has to be considered when, at the time of the proceedings in respect of an 
admissibility challenge, a domestic investigation or prosecution that could render the 
case inadmissible before the ICC has been instituted, or where the state that has 
jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.19 Secondly, the 
                                            
15
 The Rome Statute is not meant to replace a state party‟s national criminal system, but rather to 
complement that system, and in certain instances, as provided for in Article 13 of the Statute, to 
prosecute individuals after referral of that situation to the ICC by a state party or the United Nations 
Security Council or if the Prosecutor initiated an investigation in terms of Article 15 of the Statute. / To 
comply with the complementarity principle, a state party that has ratified the Rome Statute has to 
provide under their national law for the investigation and prosecution of international crimes as 
specified in the Rome Statute. A number of other international treaties require state parties to enact 
domestic laws that would enable domestic prosecutions of crimes contained in those treaties. An 
example of this is Article 5 of the 1948 Genocide Convention which expressly specifies that a state 
party to the convention ―…undertake[s] to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the 
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention…‖. Similar provisions 
are also included in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the Torture convention of 1984 / 
On 1 February 2010, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, issued a Prosecutorial Strategy Paper 
for the period 2009-2012, detailing a strategy of “positive complementarity” wherein the OTP 
encourages national proceedings where possible,  https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/66A8dcdc-
3650-4514-AA62 D229D1128F65/281506/otpProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf also refers to the 
OTP‟s 2016-2018 prosecutorial Policy https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-
otp_strategic_plan_2016-2018.pdf     (Accessed on 27 March 2017).  
16
 As per Articles 17(1)(a) and 20(3) of the Rome Statute.   
17
 Nouwen S.M.H Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The catalysing effect of the International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan 2013 (Cambridge University Press).  
18
 Situation: Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, judgment by the Appeals Chamber on 25 September 2009.  
19
 Judgement by the Appeals Chamber of the ICC, dated 25 September 2009 in the matter of: 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui at paragraphs 75 to 86 of the judgment.  
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court found that inaction on the part of a state that has jurisdiction will render a case 
admissible before the ICC, subject to Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.20  
The principle of cooperation and judicial assistance is set out in Part 9 of the Rome 
Statute and determines that state parties shall cooperate fully with the Court in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.21 The ICC 
is not endowed with a police force authorised and empowered to apprehend 
suspects or to gather evidence. Therefore, the ICC relies on the cooperation of 
existing national criminal justice systems for assistance.22 By ratifying the Rome 
Statute, states are bound by the terms of the treaty provisions and failure to 
cooperate with the ICC should be seen in a very serious light. 23 
The Rome Statute is a powerful tool to investigate and prosecute international 
crimes.24 Since the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998, and entering into 
force on 1 July 2002, 124 countries have become parties, the majority being African 
countries. Yet only a few of those African state parties have implemented domestic 
legislation.25 Even though state parties are not compelled to domesticate the Rome 
Statute by way of an implementation act as South Africa has done, a state party‟s 
commitment to the Rome Statute implies that they would be in a position to punish 
the crimes listed in the Rome Statute by relying on their domestic statutes. According 
to Yang “the precondition for a state to exercise her national criminal jurisdiction is to 
recognize that the crimes listed in the Rome Statute are crimes also punishable 
                                            
20
 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07 and The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui ICC-01/04-02/12.  
21
 Article 86 of the Rome Statute.  
22
 Ngari A.R State cooperation within the context of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2013).   
23
 In terms of international treaties, the principle of Pacta sunt servanda requires a state party to 
honour the obligations incurred by that country when signing and ratifying a treaty. It also signals to 
other parties to the treaty that they can rely upon one another to respect the rights which they have 
incurred by becoming a state party to the treaty.  
24
 Dicker R and Duffy H “National Courts and the ICC” 1999 The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
Volume 6, Issue 1 Pages 53-63 / Nanda V.P “The establishment of a permanent International 
Criminal Court: Challenges ahead” 1998 Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 2, Pages 413-
428.   
25
 According to a report by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, on the status of the Rome 
Statute around the world, the following statistics are available for African state parties: 10 countries 
have enacted implementation legislation, 9 countries have partial legislation in place, and 3 countries 
have started drafting legislation but the process has stalled. What is worrying is the fact that 23 
African countries have made no effort to domesticate the Rome Statute. / A copy of the report can be 
accessed at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RomeStatuteUpdate_2013_web.pdf (Accessed on 22 
March 2017).  
15 
 
under her national legislation”.26 This creates a problematic situation as it forces the 
ICC, which is meant to be a court of last resort to prosecute offenders that could 
have been prosecuted by a state party.27 The complementarity principle is also 
designed to protect and to enhance the sovereignty of a state party, and by failing to 
investigate and prosecute offenders, a state would in fact undermine this principle.28 
According to the Parliamentarians for Global Action, a state party is also in a better 
position to prosecute an individual and domestic prosecution also carries with it 
important benefits for the state concerned.29 For instance, it allows the state an 
opportunity to strengthen its own criminal justice system to prosecute international 
crimes at a domestic level. Domestic implementation legislation has a deterrent 
effect in that a potential perpetrator might reconsider his actions before committing 
them due to the high probability of a local arrest and prosecution.30 Effective 
legislation also ensures direct cooperation and communication between national 
authorities and their counterparts at the ICC.31 The complementarity principle further 
provides for the precise and detailed definitions of crimes and their penalties 
ensuring legal certainty. Lastly, it strengthens the rights of the victims by ensuring 
that fair trials are conducted at a national level. 32  
 
                                            
26
 Yang L “On the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court” 2005 Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 4, Issue 1 , Pages 121-132. Yang is of the 
opinion that there are mainly three ways in which a state party can implement substantive legislation 
to ensure compliance with their obligations namely, a. Drafting new implementation legislation, b. 
Amending its existing criminal legislation by ensuring that the crimes in the Rome Statute are 
incorporated into the existing legislation or c. Applying the domestic criminal law in prosecuting 
international crimes as ordinary offences.  
27
 The ICC also has limited resources, and failure by a state party to prosecute offenders would result 
in impunity, which defeats one of the primary objectives of the Rome Statute.  
28
 Benzing M “The complementarity regime of the International Criminal Court: International criminal 
Justice between state sovereignty and the fight against impunity” 2003, Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, Volume 7, Pages 591-632. The principle relates to the protection of the primacy 
of national jurisdiction.  
29
 http://www.pgaction.org/about/ (Accessed on 22 March 2017).  
30
 Sainati T “Divided we fall: How the International Criminal Court can promote compliance with 
international law by working with regional courts” 2016 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Volume 49, Pages 191-243. 
31
 This also provides additional safeguards for the protection of judicial independence of courts and 
prosecuting authorities against interference by executive and/or legislative organs of state. 
32
 Bergsmo M, Complementarity and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for core international crimes 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher and Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2010) / Burke-White W.B 
“Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome 
System of International Justice” 2008, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 49, Issue 1, Pages 
53-108, where the author discusses the implications of a policy of proactive complementarity by a 
state party.  
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1.2  Justification and Objective of the Study  
The main problem this work seeks to address is the challenges facing selected 
African countries with regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute. As 
discussed above, the issues surrounding the implementation of the Rome Statute 
relate to complementarity and cooperation by state parties. In this light, it is important 
to differentiate between objective and subjective challenges faced by the selected 
countries.  
Four African countries will be studied in this work. The work will focus on two 
Southern African Development Community (hereinafter referred to as “SADC”)33 
countries, namely South Africa and Botswana, South African legislation in the form of 
the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, 
200234  (hereinafter referred to as the “ICC Act”) and Botswana, who introduced the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill, in Botswana‟s National 
Assembly.35  
According to Stone the official explanation put forward by Botswana‟s government 
for the country‟s long delay in drafting implementation legislation is a severe lack of 
expertise and human capital on the specific issue.36 Stone goes on to state that a 
further explanation for their delay in compliance is the proliferation of treaty 
obligations on the part of Botswana. ICC matters are also viewed as low priority 
matters, and resources are diverted to other more pressing matters. Currently 
                                            
33
 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization 
headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana. Its goal is to further socio-economic cooperation and 
integration as well as political and security cooperation among 15 southern African states. It 
complements the role of the African Union. http://www.sadc.int/ (Accessed on 31 March 2017).  
34
 South Africa was the first African country to sign the Rome Statute of the ICC on 17 July 1998. This 
was ratified on 27 November 2000. South Africa then incorporated the Rome Statute into  domestic 
law in terms of Section 231(4) of the Constitution by enacting the Implementation of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court Act (Act 27 of 2002), which was assented to on 12 July 2002. 
35
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill, Bill No. 22 of 2014. The Bill was passed 
during 2017, and The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act was adopted by the 
Botswana Parliament. The Act is however not yet accessible, and for purposes of this study the Bill 
will be used.   
36
 Stone L “Unable or Unwilling” Case Studies on Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in 
Selected African Countries https://www.issafrica.org/chapter-4-country-study-i-botswana-lee-stone 
(Accessed on 4 May 2016). 
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Botswana has failed to report to any of the treaty monitoring bodies that were 
established to monitor compliance with the various international law treaties.37  
This work will also include a review of two non-SADC countries, namely Kenya and 
Uganda. Kenya signed the Rome Statute on 11 August 1999, and ratified it on 15 
March 2005, and thereafter adopted the International Crimes Act in 2008 into its 
domestic legislation. Kenya was chosen for the study in order to judge the 
effectiveness of the legislation in dealing with international crimes that were 
perpetrated after the 2007-2008 Kenyan presidential elections. Uganda signed the 
Rome Statute on 17 March 1999, and ratified it on 14 June 2002. On 10 March 2010, 
the International Criminal Court Act was unanimously adopted by its Parliament. The 
Act entered into force on 25 June 2010, and makes provision for both cooperation 
and complementarity. Although implementation of the Rome Statute has been 
achieved by Uganda, additional legislation will be required to ensure that Uganda 
can close the impunity gap that currently exists.38 
African countries have a very poor record when it comes to honouring their 
compliance with regard to their obligations under international human rights 
treaties.39  There is no straightforward answer to the question of non-compliance, 
and it seems to be a much more complicated situation than merely their lacking the 
will to comply. Accordingly, some scholars are of the view that instead of deliberately 
disregarding the relevant human rights instruments, many of the countries quite 
simply lack the necessary skills, manpower and resources required to comply with 
the increasingly complex set of obligations and norms incurred by their governments 
through the signing of these treaties.40 Furthermore, some of the more important 
                                            
37
 Stone L “Unable or Unwilling” Case Studies on Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in 
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factors that play a role with regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute by 
African countries can be described as political obstacles. In this regard the work 
seeks to study the African Union (hereafter referred to as the “AU”) and its influence 
on its member states. 41 
The focus of this work, however, will be to explore the more objective factors such as 
insufficient legislation, lack of resources and different legal systems, for example, 
some countries‟ laws only provide for either complementarity or cooperation clauses 
and are fraught with implementation problems. The question then arises whether the 
domestication of the Rome Statute in these countries should not be standardised. 
According to Tladi, at the moment there is no comprehensive treaty or instrument 
that places an obligation on a state party to criminalise and exercise jurisdiction of 
international crimes as specified in the Rome Statute at a national level.42 
Furthermore, there is no convention in place to regulate interstate cooperation, which 
hampers the successful investigation of international crimes.43 At this stage, states 
are reliant on mutual legal assistance agreements in investigating international 
crimes.44 
As already mentioned, certain African countries rarely have the capacity, both 
human and administrative, to implement a system of complementarity and 
cooperation. Yet another problem is that some countries‟ lack the necessary detailed 
legislation, and as a result these countries can only prosecute certain international 
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crimes, and not all the crimes specified by the Rome Statute.45 Different countries 
have different legal systems, and with countries that follow a dualist system, 
international law is not directly incorporated into their domestic legal system and first 
needs to be legislated before it can be applied by their national courts.46   
As previously stated, the objective of the study is to identify problem areas with 
regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute, and after identifying these issues, 
to suggest solutions that can be implemented to give full effect to the Rome Statute. 
According to Amnesty International‟s Checklist for the Effective Implementation of 
the Rome Statute, the implementation of a state‟s obligations under the Rome 
Statute is not merely limited to enacting legislation, but also extends to actually 
implementing that legislation through investigations and prosecutions in national 
courts, and to promptly cooperate with all requests made by the ICC. Additionally, 
the checklist also includes the training of officials as well as educating the general 
public. 47 
Should African countries not find a solution to the challenges facing the 
implementation of the Rome Statute, and with the AU‟s despondency with the 
workings of the ICC, there exists a real possibility that the AU might create a 
separate court to prosecute international crimes. Former Deputy Chief Justice 
Dikgang Moseneke has endorsed the idea of an African international criminal court, 
observing:  
 “Will an African ICC serve us better? The answer may be yes. African people 
deserve to be spared atrocities by their leaders. African leaders have no right to 
oppress their people and think there will be no consequences. An African ICC 
could work‖.48  
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However, as the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (aimed at providing that court with 
jurisdiction over international crimes), which the AU adopted at its 23rd ordinary 
session in June 2014, identified “structural and financial challenges”, it is doubtful 
whether an African criminal court will become a reality in the near future.49 It is the 
present author‟s view that a separate African criminal court would constitute a major 
setback for international criminal justice, and would certainly create more problems 
than it would solve. The creation of a separate Criminal Chamber in the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights could trigger a mass exodus by African states 
from the ICC, and would also result in jurisdictional problems for the remaining ICC 
state parties, since they are not part of the AU, and would not have access to the 
Criminal Chamber.   
It is therefore imperative that a truly workable solution is proposed to facilitate the 
implementation of the Rome Statute and to address any misgivings that exist 
between the ICC and the AU.  One such solution as proposed by Du Plessis and 
Gevers,50 is to employ the doctrine of effective construction in order to balance the 
competing obligations countries have when they are both state parties to the Rome 
Statute and member states of the AU. Whether this could be a lasting solution 
remains to be seen.   
Enhancing complementarity has obvious benefits in that African states will be in a 
position to prosecute international crimes independently, which would reduce the 
need for the ICC‟s involvement, while at the same time mitigating the AU‟s criticism 
that the ICC is biased against Africa.51 There are two recent international initiatives 
focused on facilitating a state‟s capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
international crimes. The first of these is the study by the International Law 
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Commission of crimes against humanity. The second is the initiative by Belgium, 
Slovenia and the Netherlands to create a convention on mutual legal assistance with 
respect to the Rome Statute.52 Creating a convention focused on African countries 
could also facilitate compliance by African state parties to the Rome Statute. SADC 
very early on developed a model enabling act as part of their process towards 
ratification of the Rome Statute.53 This model enabling act was presented at the 
SADC workshop on the ratification of the Rome Statute, which took place in Pretoria 
during July 1999.54 Although basic in its design it does provide all the necessary 
guidelines for states to incorporate the Rome Statute into their domestic legislation.  
In order to identify problem areas with regard to the implementation of the Rome 
Statute by the four African countries being studied, the work will follow a quantitative 
and comparative desktop approach making use of a literature review. The approach 
to be adopted in this study will be one of problem solving; comparing South Africa‟s 
ICC Act to those of Uganda, Kenya and Botswana, and providing solutions to their 
implementation challenges. South African legislation and jurisprudence will as a 
general rule be the benchmark to test the standard of implementation of the Rome 
Statute in Botswana, Kenya and Uganda. The study is significant in that it suggests 
certain legal reforms or policy guidelines that could be implemented by the selected 
African countries in order to guarantee full implementation of the Rome Statute in a 
practical manner enabling the countries to prosecute international crimes in their 
domestic courts. The study also aims to provide a solution to the strained 
relationship between the AU and the ICC.  
The ICC Act will be discussed in the second chapter. Chapter three will be devoted 
to subjective factors influencing the implementation and application of the Rome 
Statute in African countries. Here the decisions made by the Assembly of the African 
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Union challenging the ICC and its prosecution strategy, especially the decision 
regarding President Al Bashir will be discussed, and what effect this has on the AU‟s 
current discontent with the ICC. As this is a comparative study, chapter four will look 
at Botswana, Kenya and Uganda and the challenges faced by these countries with 
the implementation of the Rome Statute. The fifth and last chapter will be dedicated 
to providing a workable solution to the challenges faced and conclusion of the study.  
 
1.3  Conclusion  
As progressive as the Rome Statute may be in ensuring that perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community are brought to justice, the 
Rome Statute will remain only an ideal if it is not effectively implemented by state 
parties.55 Even after domesticating the Rome Statute into their respective national 
legal systems, the various implementation acts need to be effectively employed by 
the courts, law enforcement authorities and prosecution authorities in order to ensure 
justice. The necessary political willpower also needs to exist to facilitate the process. 
The ICC commenced its activities on the 1st of July 2002, but to date only four 
individuals have been found guilty. 56 There is a need for state parties to not only 
cooperate with the ICC, but also to actively investigate and prosecute offenders 
through their domestic criminal legal systems. State parties are the first and most 
important line of defence against impunity, and prosecution of individuals by The 
Hague should be seen as a last resort.  
The following chapter will focus on South Africa‟s implementation of the Rome 
Statute, as well as some of the legal challenges faced in this regard. As previously 
mentioned, South Africa‟s legislation will serve as the benchmark to measure the 
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implementation of the Rome Statute in the selected African countries researched in 
this work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Chapter 2 
South Africa and the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act  
 
2.1 Introduction  
―So, we would suggest to all those war criminals internationally who perpetrate 
these most heinous crimes against mostly innocent populations not to look for a 
haven in South Africa, because the opportunity to prosecute them is there. If we 
do not do it, we will definitely collaborate with the international court to bring such 
persons to book….Another very important principle spelled out in this legislation 
is that heads of state, heads of government and members of parliaments will not 
be able to raise a defence that they are heads of state. For example, if 
honourable members followed the Pinochet case in England, that was the 
defence which was raised. This legislation will not allow a person to raise such a 
defence. If one is a member of an army or police force who took orders which 
are manifestly unlawful and one tries to use that as a defence, it will not be 
allowed as a defence in this legislation. So, in that sense, this legislation is being 
very innovative in not allowing that to happen…‖57 
 
From the abovementioned Hansard extract it is clear that the Government‟s intention 
with introducing the ICC Act was to stop impunity and to simultaneously prevent the 
occurrence of mass atrocities against innocent civilian populations in war-torn 
countries. South Africa was leading by example on the continent, and the ICC Act 
could truly be described as innovative and progressive.  
 Yet at a recent question and answer session in Parliament58 the Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development was asked whether the government of South Africa 
intends to resign as a signatory of the Rome Statute, in light of the government‟s 
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failure to meet its obligations not only as a state party to the Rome Statute, but also 
in terms of the ICC Act, due to the fact that it failed to arrest president Al-Bashir 
when he attended the Summit Meeting of the AU which was held in Johannesburg, 
in June 2015, and the subsequent litigation that followed that event.59 The response 
from Minister Masuta at the time was that ―the government has not taken any 
decision to resign as a signatory of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court”. Although this was a positive sign, on 6 June 2016, it was reported that a draft 
bill was circulated at a Cabinet meeting, the purpose of which was to withdraw South 
Africa as a state party from the Rome Statute.60 It is clear that the on-going Al-Bashir 
debacle and pressure from the AU placed the South African government in an 
unenviable position and provoked a very strong reaction from academics and civil 
society alike.  
Indeed, the question should be asked how it is possible for South Africa to change 
from a position of actively supporting the creation of an international criminal court, to 
not adhering to its authority and to risk being reported to the United Nations Security 
Council, and, as has now happened, needing to explain its failure to cooperate 
before the Bureau of the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC. It seems there is no 
clear-cut answer to this question as there currently exists a conflict between political 
interests on the one hand and both international- and domestic legal obligations on 
the other. On 19 October 2016, the Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation filed an instrument of withdrawal in terms of Section 127(1) of the Rome 
Statute, and on 2 February 2017, the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
formally introduced the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill,61 which aims to repeal the ICC Act in its entirety.  For 
the purpose of this study, and as the ICC Act has not yet been repealed, the Act will 
be used to measure compliance and implementation of the Rome Statute by other 
African state parties.  
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2.2 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act 27 of 2002   
By the time South Africa attended the Rome Confrence, it had already as a member 
of the SADC countries, participated in efforts to establish such a court as early as 
1993. After 1993, the SADC countries met on various occasions to ensure that they 
would present a joint and uniform front during the Rome Statute negotiations.  The 
SADC countries adopted a document called “the Principles of Consensus” in Pretoria 
14 September 1997. This document later became the “instruction manual” for SADC 
negotiations during the Rome Conference. Thereafter an African Conference on the 
International Criminal Court was held from 5 to 6 February 1998, where the Dakar 
Declaration of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court was adopted. 
The ten SADC negotiating principles,62 adopted by SADC members a few months 
prior, consequently formed the basis on which the Dakar Declaration was adopted.63 
After the successful adoption of the Rome Statute, a follow-up meeting was held by 
the SADC countries where the Model Enabling Act, Ratification Kit for the ICC and a 
Common Understanding which would guide the states in their approach in ratification 
of the Statute was adopted.64 South Africa lodged its instrument of ratification of the 
Rome Statute on 10 November 2000, becoming the 23rd state party, and on 1 July 
2002 the Statute became operational. Shortly thereafter, on 18 July 2002, Parliament 
passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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Act 27 of 2002 (the ICC Act), which came into effect on 16 August of that year. In all 
of this it can be said that South Africa led by example. 
In line with South Africa‟s duty as a state party, and in terms of Section 231(4) of the 
Constitution, on 18 July 2002, Parliament passed the ICC Act. The Act was 
implemented to ensure that South Africa complies with its obligations as a state party 
to the Rome Statute. The ICC Act incorporated the Rome Statute in its entirety as a 
schedule to the Act. According to du Plessis, the Act:   
“has three main aims, the first of which is to do justice to the complementarity 
principle built into the Rome Statute whereby states are expected to prosecute 
individuals within their national criminal justice jurisdictions for crimes the ICC 
would otherwise have jurisdiction over. The second aim of the Act is to ensure 
that South Africa is able to cooperate fully with the ICC, and thirdly, it enacts into 
South African domestic law the substantive offences the ICC may assert 
jurisdiction over, the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes”.65  
So thorough was South Africa‟s commitment to comply with the Rome Statute that 
the preamble of the ICC Act states: 
―…the Republic of South Africa is committed to bringing persons who commit 
such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law of the Republic in terms of its 
domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its international obligations to do so 
when the Republic became party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, or in the event of the national prosecuting authority of the 
Republic declining or being unable to do so, in line with the principle of 
complementarity as contemplated in the Statute, in the International Criminal 
Court, created by and functioning in terms of the said Statute; and carrying out 
its other obligations in terms of the said Statute…‖.  
The principles espoused above were also included in the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development‟s memorandum setting out the objects of the bill to the 
Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Affairs, when it was first referred to 
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them in August of 2001.66 After the commencement of the Act, by presidential 
proclamation,67 on 23 May 2003, the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) was 
created. The unit is located within the Office of the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and is responsible for managing and directing investigations and 
prosecutions arising from the ICC Act.68 The Directorate of Priority Crimes 
Investigation (the DPCI or “Hawks”) is the specialised investigative unit within the 
SAPS responsible for the investigation of international crimes.  
 
2.3 A closer look at the ICC Act  
The ICC Act consists of five chapters. As with the Rome Statute, Chapter One of the 
Act defines genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Chapter Two deals 
with the jurisdiction of South African courts as well as the institution of prosecutions 
in South Africa with respect to the defined crimes. In Chapter Three the functioning, 
privileges and immunities of the Court are dealt with, whilst in Chapter Four 
cooperation with and assistance to the Court in or outside the country is discussed. 
Chapter Five deals with miscellaneous matters incidental to the functioning of the 
Court. Only the parts of the ICC Act most relevant to this study will be discussed, as 
a complete detailed discussion of the workings of the Act falls outside the scope of 
this dissertation.  
 
2.3.1 Jurisdiction of South African Courts  
International criminal law recognises five different bases for the establishment of 
jurisdiction by a state. They are territoriality, nationality, passive personality 
jurisdiction, the protective principle and the universality principle.69 
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In terms of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, national courts have jurisdiction over 
a crime without reference to the place of the crime, the nationality of the victim or 
perpetrator, or any other link between the crime and the nation that is prosecuting 
the matter. The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is linked to the peremptory norm of 
―ius cogens‖70 and the concept of ―erga omnes‖.71 South Africa exercises universal 
jurisdiction based on its international obligations under both treaty law and 
customary international law.72 South Africa is also a state party to the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,73 colloquially referred to as the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture.  
The ICC Act establishes a number of jurisdictional grounds by which a South African 
court might be seized with the prosecution of a person alleged to be guilty of the 
abovementioned crimes. Not only does the ICC Act create jurisdiction for South 
African courts over international crimes as defined by the Rome Statute, but in terms 
of Section 4(3) it endows our courts with extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute a 
person who commits a core crime outside the territory of South Africa in four 
instances. Section 4(3) reads as follows:  
‖In order to secure the jurisdiction of a South African court for purposes of this 
Chapter, any person who commits a crime contemplated in subsection (1) 
outside the territory of the Republic, is deemed to have committed that crime in 
the territory of the Republic if—(a) that person is a South African citizen; or  
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(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic; or  
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the 
Republic; or  
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or 
against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.‖ 
Before the ICC Act came into force, the position in South Africa, as in most other 
common law countries, was that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction relied upon the 
principle of territoriality.74 However according to du Plessis,75 Section 4(3)(c) even 
goes as far  
―…as to create universal jurisdiction for South African courts with respect to 
certain crimes that attract universal jurisdiction by their egregious nature, and 
consequently over the perpetrators of such crimes on the basis that they are 
common enemies of mankind.‖   
This provision uniquely allows South Africa to prosecute an individual for the 
commission of a crime in another country, when that person is present in our country 
afterwards. From the above it is clear that this legislation‟s intent was that crimes 
covered by the ICC Act should be prosecuted regardless of where they have been 
committed. This interpretation of Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act was confirmed in a 
unanimous judgment by the Constitutional Court in the judgment of National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre and Another,76 which was handed down on 30 October 2014. In 
short, the factual background that gave rise to the Constitutional Court judgment 
related to accusations of torture inflicted upon supporters of the opposition political 
party by the Zimbabwean Police Force prior to national elections being held in 
Zimbabwe.  
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In the judgment, the court held that South Africa had the power and duty to 
investigate crimes against humanity that occurred in a foreign territory against 
foreign nationals.77 This judgement can truly be seen as a landmark in South Africa‟s 
international criminal law, as it clearly sets out South Africa‟s obligations as a state 
party and the conditions that would trigger the duty to investigate a crime under the 
ICC Act. As stated by Majiedt AJ, the very core of the judgment goes to South 
Africa‟s responsibility as a “member of the family of nations‖ to investigate crimes 
against humanity.78 The importance of the judgment lies in the court‟s interpretation 
of South Africa‟s duty to investigate allegations of crimes against humanity even 
though the perpetrator may not be present in the territory of South Africa.79 Without 
this interpretation of Section 4(3) of the ICC Act, South Africa‟s hands would 
effectively be tied.   
This reasoning is in accordance with both the Constitution and the Rome Statute 
which also distinguishes between the investigation of crimes on the one hand, and 
the prosecution of those crimes on the other.80 The court did however state that 
universal jurisdiction to investigate international crimes cannot be absolute, and that 
it is subject to two very important limitations.81 The first limitation relates to the 
principle of subsidiarity which entails that there must be a substantial and true 
connection between the subject matter and the source of the jurisdiction, and that 
South African authorities can only investigate a matter where the other country is 
unwilling or unable to do so.82The second limitation relates to the principle of 
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practicality, and whether an investigation can actually result in the prosecution of a 
perpetrator.  
The court also noted that the need for state parties to comply with their international 
obligations to prosecute these crimes is most crucial when the crimes are committed 
by citizens of countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute. This makes perfect 
sense, because, should a state party fail to investigate and prosecute such cases, it 
would permit impunity. The only way to bring such perpetrators to book would be for 
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, subject to, certain limitations.83 
What is of crucial importance to the current study, are some of the reasons identified 
by the court furnished by the South African authorities for not investigating the 
matter. The first of these reasons relate to the South African Police Service‟s lack of 
insight into the facts of the matter and their misinterpretation of the law applicable 
thereto.84 The SAPS took the view that South African courts would not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes committed in Zimbabwe, by Zimbabweans, against 
their own countrymen. However the court correctly pointed out the differences 
between the jurisdiction relating to the investigation of a crime and the jurisdiction 
relating to the prosecution thereof where an individual‟s presence is necessary.85  
The second reason given by the SAPS was that any investigation would be 
potentially harmful to South Africa – Zimbabwe relations. It seems that political 
considerations were seen to outweigh the duty of the SAPS to investigate crime as 
mandated by the Constitution. The court however stated that 
―Political inter-state tensions are, in most instances, virtually unavoidable as far 
as the application of universality, the Rome Statute and, in the present instance, 
the ICC Act is concerned‖.86 
The court further stated that “an investigation within the South African territory does 
not offend against the principle of non-intervention…”.87 Again, political and 
diplomatic considerations seem to halter the effective implementation of the Rome 
                                            
83
 Section4(3) of the ICC Act.  
84
 The law in this case relates to the interpretation of the Constitution, the ICC Act and the South 
African Police Service Act, Act 68 of 1995.  
85
 At paragraphs 77 to 81 of the judgment.  
86
 At paragraph 74 of the judgment.  
87
 At paragraph 78 of the judgment.  
33 
 
Statute. As stated by Werle and Bornkamm, the SAPS and National Prosecuting 
Authority should be guided solely by legal considerations.88  Ventura is of the view 
that despite the court clearly stating that political considerations should not influence 
the decision to investigate, it would always be possible to dress a decision not to 
investigate in non-political colours, such as the geographical remoteness of the 
crime, the unrealistic prospects of obtaining the requisite evidence, that the relevant 
state would not agree to extradition, or that the amount of resources necessary for 
the investigation would not be available.89 He further states that  
―It could very well be that upon judicial review these grounds are held to be well 
founded and rational, but at the same time there will always be the lingering 
doubt as to whether politics played a role and just simply not put on paper”.90  
According to Ventura, the National Prosecuting Authority and the Hawks would have 
been obliged to amend their policies and internal processes in order to give effect to 
the judgement.91 What effect the judgement will have on the practical processes of 
the investigation and the prosecution of international crimes in South Africa remains 
to be seen.  
 
2.3.2 Complementarity  
As stated in Chapter 1, the concept of complementarity was only adopted in the 
Genocide Convention of 1948, and thereafter in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It 
was however with the establishment by the United Nations Security Council of 
tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the prosecution and punishment of violations 
of fundamental norms of the international community that the concept of concurrent 
jurisdiction, with the primacy of international jurisdiction was first created.92 The 
tribunals did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes that fell within their ambit, 
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and the national courts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda also had the necessary 
jurisdiction to institute prosecutions.93  With the creation of the Rome Statute, the 
concept was included, albeit with some compromise on the side of the drafters of the 
statute, in that a state party must genuinely be unwilling or unable to prosecute a 
perpetrator before the ICC‟s jurisdiction in the matter will be triggered. The ICC 
therefore does not have primary jurisdiction, and the Court‟s jurisdiction therefore 
differs from that of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals. Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute 
states as follows 
―Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where:(a) The case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has  jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
 (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and 
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to 
prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject 
of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, 
paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.‖ 
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According to McHenry, Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute sets forth four conditions 
under which the ICC must make a determination that a case is inadmissible.94 Two 
of these conditions specifically refer to state sovereignty. The first condition  being 
that a pending investigation or prosecution is being instituted in a domestic court that 
has the necessary jurisdiction, or the second, that after an investigation has been 
conducted, a state with the necessary jurisdiction has taken a decision not to 
prosecute the individual(s).95Complementarity was incorporated into the ICC Act, 
although no prosecution has ever been instituted by South Africa.  
As stated by Jurdi, complementarity is a complex jurisdictional relationship between 
the ICC and national systems of state parties that has a wide impact on state 
sovereignty on the one hand and the fight against impunity on the other.96 Crimes 
against humanity are widely accepted as ius cogens crimes, which would elicit 
prosecution by states.  Jurdi mentions that  
―The principle of complementarity emerges from the community‘s intention to 
end impunity for these heinous crimes. If the state is unwilling or unable, then the 
Court will fill the gap. Through complementarity, either the member state or the 
Court is able to fulfil an international duty to prosecute these crimes‖.97   
The procedure for the institution of a prosecution in South Africa is set out in Section 
5 of the ICC Act, which states as follows  
‖(1)  No prosecution may be instituted against a person accused of having 
committed a crime without the consent of the National Director. 
(2)  No prosecution may be instituted against a person accused of having 
committed a crime if the crime in question is alleged to have been committed 
before the commencement of the Statute. 
(3)  The National Director must, when reaching a decision on whether to institute 
a prosecution contemplated in this section, give recognition to the obligation that 
the Republic, in the first instance and in line with the principle of complementarity 
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as contemplated in Article 1 of the Statute, has jurisdiction and the responsibility 
to prosecute persons accused of having committed a crime. 
(4)  The Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must, in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of South Africa and after consultation with the 
National Director and, in writing, designate an appropriate High Court in which to 
conduct a prosecution against any person accused of having committed a crime. 
(5)  If the National Director, for any reason, declines to prosecute a person under 
this section, he or she must provide the Central Authority with the full reasons for 
his or her decision and the Central Authority must forward that decision, together 
with the reasons, to the Registrar of the Court. 
(6) A decision by the National Director not to prosecute a person under this 
section does not preclude the prosecution of that person in the Court.‖ 
An interesting aspect of this section is that permission from the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions is necessary before any criminal action can be instituted against 
an individual. Other than interests of national security or perhaps a conflict of interest 
with a pre-existing international obligation, it is not clear on what grounds the NDPP 
could refuse to institute a prosecution. In the matter of Southern African Litigation 
Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, Judge 
Fabricius stated as follows: 
―Respondents failed to discharge their individual and or collective responsibility 
to initiate, manage and direct an investigation in a co-operative manner as 
envisaged by the ICC Act, and legally required in terms of the NPA Act and 
SAPS Act, as read with the Presidential Proclamation relating to the Second 
Respondent. It was submitted that the reasons filed by the Respondents together 
with their answering affidavits confirmed that they had failed to apply their mind 
seriously to their obligations under the ICC Act, and to have wholly 
misunderstood the nature of that Act and their duties hereunder‖98 
This would mean that the NDPP in giving reasons for not prosecuting, had failed to 
even consider the ICC Act and the obligations it places on South Africa.  
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Section 5(1) of the ICC Act is open to the risk of being abused, either for political 
reasons or due to a lack of will to prosecute. This is very disconcerting if one takes 
into consideration that complementarity is one of the cornerstones of the ICC, and by 
prosecuting an individual through a states party‟s domestic legislation, an ICC 
prosecution will be avoided. Currently the Rome Statute only makes provision for an 
ICC prosecution if a state party is genuinely ―unwilling or unable‖ to prosecute. 
Fortunately, the Constitutional Court judgment that followed after the SCA judgement 
of the abovementioned case set the record straight as to South Africa‟s duty to 
investigate international human rights crimes.99    
Another problem foreseen with complementarity is that in certain instances the 
charges in a domestic prosecution of an individual will not necessarily cover the 
same conduct that is being pursued by the ICC, or yet another, that the parameters 
of a domestic prosecution will be limited by that state party‟s inability to effectively 
prosecute the individual, irrespective of whether this is due to ineffective local 
statutes, limited resources or human capital, or even the fact that the defendant in 
the matter will not receive a fair trial should he or she be prosecuted by the domestic 
courts, as has been the case in Libya in the post Gaddafi era. 100  
 
2.3.3 Cooperation with and assistance to the ICC 
This part of the ICC Act has been divided into two parts. The first part deals with 
cooperation with the ICC by South Africa in the form of the arrest and/or surrender of 
wanted individuals to the ICC. The second part deals with judicial assistance to the 
ICC, and the various ways in which South Africa as a state party can provide such 
assistance. It was Chapter 4 of the ICC Act that came under scrutiny  when 
President Al-Bashir visited South Africa in June 2015, in order to attend the AU 
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Summit Meeting which was held in Johannesburg, and his subsequent exit from 
South Africa whilst an arrest warrant and court order from the North Gauteng High 
Court was granted which effectively ordered the authorities to arrest him. The study 
will discuss and analyse the current Supreme Court of Appeal judgment delivered on 
15 March 2016 in the matter of The Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre,101 as it is unlikely that the 
Constitutional Court will have the opportunity to deliver a judgment, since the state 
withdrew its appeal of the SCA judgment.102 The judgment also deals with immunity 
of heads of state. In the abovementioned case, the court stated that in passing the 
ICC Act, South Africa did so on the basis that all forms of immunity, including head of 
state immunity, could not be relied upon to either stop a prosecution of international 
crimes in South Africa, or to prevent South Africa from cooperating with the ICC by 
way of arresting and surrendering any person charged with such crimes by the 
ICC.103  
Can immunity by a non-states party be used as a way to frustrate the application of 
the ICC Act? For the purposes of this study, international law in general recognises 
two types of immunity. Immunity of state officials ratione personae, meaning 
immunity that is attached to an office or status held by an official, and secondly, 
immunity of state officials ratione materiae, being immunity that is attached to official 
acts performed by officials. South African legislation in the form of the Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges Act104 provides for head of state immunity from civil and 
criminal jurisdiction to the extent provided for by customary international law.105 
However, Section 4(2) and 10(9) of the ICC Act explicitly states that being a head of 
state or government106 cannot be used as a defence when being charged for 
international crimes. Likewise, Article 27 of the Rome Statute states that 
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―1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based 
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a 
ground for reduction of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”.  
The first time the defence of immunity was tested in South Africa with regard to the 
ICC Act was in the matter of The Southern Africa Litigation Centre v The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, in the North Gauteng High Court, and the 
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre. 
The appeal court held that  
―…when South Africa decided to implement its obligations under the Rome 
Statute by passing the Implementation Act it did so on the basis that all forms of 
immunity, including head of state immunity, would not constitute a bar to the 
prosecution of international crimes in this country or to South Africa cooperating 
with the ICC by way of the arrest and surrender of persons charged with such 
crimes before the ICC, where an arrest warrant had been issued and a request 
for cooperation made‖.107  
Although the Constitutional Court will probably not have an opportunity to rule in the 
matter, it is the author‟s view that the Constitutional Court would in all likelihood have 
concurred with the SCA judgement.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
(a) is or was a head of State or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official; or  
(b) being a member of a security service or armed force, was under a legal obligation to obey a 
manifestly unlawful order of a government or superior, is neither— 
(i) a defence to a crime; nor 
(ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted of a crime.‖  
 
Further Section 10(9) of the ICC Act states that: 
―The fact that the person to be surrendered is a person contemplated in section 4 (2) (a) or (b) does 
not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an order contemplated in subsection (5)‖ 
107
 At 103 of the judgment.  
40 
 
2.3.4 The Limitations of the ICC Act 
Although the ICC Act is a very powerful piece of legislation, it does have certain 
limitations. It is a trite legal principle that, unless the contrary appears either 
expressly or by necessary implication, an act of parliament does not have retroactive 
working.108 The ICC Act can therefore only be applied to crimes that took place after 
the Act came into force on 16 August 2002. Gevers is of the view that in terms of 
Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution, the ICC Act could be extended to crimes under 
customary international law that took place before the ICC Act came into force.109 
This argument will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5 of the study. The ICC 
Act is also limited in its scope in terms of crimes that can be investigated and 
prosecuted in South Africa, these crimes being the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.110 
 
2.4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa111 
South Africa‟s Constitution in relation to international law and its place in our legal 
system is the golden thread that runs through all of the abovementioned cases. Our 
Constitution is very clear regarding the status of international law in South Africa. 
Section 233 of the Constitution states that  
“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”. 
In the matter of Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 
Ngcobo CJ states that ―Our Constitution reveals a clear determination to ensure that 
the Constitution and South African law are interpreted to comply with international 
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law, in particular international human rights law‖.112 This sentiment was again 
expressed by Majiedt AJ, in National Commissioner of the South African Police 
Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another and in the 
matter of The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern 
African Litigation Centre.113 
 
2.5  South Africa’s Withdrawal from the Rome Statute 
On 19 October 2016, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation filed an 
instrument of withdrawal in terms of Section 127(1) of the Rome Statute, thereby 
giving the United Nations Secretary-General one year‟s notice of South Africa‟s 
intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute. In a media briefing dated 21 October 
2016, the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services gave reasons why the 
cabinet took the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute.114 
On 21 October 2016, the Minister of Justice also wrote to the Chairperson of the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP) informing her, ex post facto, of Cabinet‟s 
decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute.115 Apart from setting out the reasons for 
Cabinet‟s decision and confirming that the SCA judgment was in fact correct when it 
found that the ICC Act overrides head of state immunity, the letter went on to 
suggest that South Africa would still continue to pursue perpetrators of international 
crimes.  
From the abovementioned it is clear that should the ICC Act be repealed by 
parliament, it will need to be replaced with new substantive legislation that provides a 
similar mechanism for domestic prosecution of international crimes in South Africa. It 
can only be assumed that such new legislation will be based on the fundamental 
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human rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the 
Constitution will have to act as guidelines.  
In the matter of The Democratic Alliance v The Minister of International Relations 
and Cooperation and 9 Others, Deputy Judge President Mojapelo, writing on behalf 
of a full bench, found that the notice of withdrawal signed by the Minister of 
International Relations and Cooperation and delivered to the UN Secretary-General, 
without prior parliamentary approval, was unconstitutional and invalid, and that the 
notice should be revoked by the government.116 The judgment deals with the powers 
of the national executive to negotiate, sign and withdraw from international treaties. 
The court refrained from expressing any view on the substantive grounds for the 
government to withdraw from the Rome Statute.117 The court did however state that  
―The question should be: what is so pressing for the national executive about the 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute which cannot wait for our legislative 
processes (and possibly judicial pronouncements) to take their course? 
Government respondents have not provided any explanation for this seemingly 
urgent need to withdraw from the Rome Statute. All these, in our view, point to 
one conclusion: the prematurity and procedural irrationality of the lodging of the 
notice of withdrawal by the national executive without first consulting parliament. 
This unexplained haste, in our view, itself constitutes procedural irrationality‖.118 
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2.6  Conclusion 
By signing the Rome Statute and by domesticating it by way of passing the ICC Act, 
South Africa incorporated the Statute into the country‟s legal system. This was a 
momentous occasion and signalled South Africa‟s will to put a stop to impunity.  The 
Constitutional Court judgment in the matter of National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service v Southern African Litigation Centre and Another showed that 
there are still hurdles facing African countries with regard to the implementation of 
the Rome Statute, be that due to the complex nature of the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes or, as in the case of The Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre due to political 
intervention and the traditionally recognised concept of Head of State immunity.  
What is clear is that by failing to arrest President Al-Bashir on an international arrest 
warrant whilst present in our country, South Africa‟s executive demonstrated that it 
can choose which national law and which international obligation to honour in order 
to suit the government‟s interests. This not only creates legal uncertainty in South 
Africa, but also sets a precedent for the future conduct of the government and denies 
the victims of core international crimes the justice which they deserve. This alone 
creates one of the biggest stumbling blocks for the effective implementation of the 
Rome Statute.  
De Wet119 is of the view that the issuing of the host state agreement by South Africa 
prior to the hosting of the AU summit may have been a way to try and circumvent 
South Africa‟s obligations under the ICC Act, and that there is a very noticeable shift 
in the government‟s attitude and an increasing reluctance to give effect to the 
country‟s domestic obligations. She notes that in 2009, South Africa cautioned 
President Al-Bashir not to attend the inauguration of President Zuma, as he would 
risk being surrendered to the ICC upon his arrival here. However the decision by 
South Africa to host the summit in 2015, without issuing a similar warning indicates a 
change in attitude towards the country‟s obligations under the ICC Act.  
On 6 July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II delivered judgment in the matter of The 
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, regarding South Africa‟s non-
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compliance to a request by the ICC to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir.120 
The Court stated that in terms of customary international law, a state is prevented 
from exercising criminal jurisdiction against the head of state of another country.121 
However, the court found that Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute excludes the 
immunity of heads of state from arrest. The Court went on to state that 
―…the Chamber considers that since immunity from arrest would bar the Court 
from the exercise of its jurisdiction, the general exclusionary clause of article 
27(2) of the Statute, in its plain meaning, also encompasses that immunity. Had 
the drafters of the Statute intended exclusion only of a narrow category of 
immunities, they would have expressed it in plain language. The language used 
in that provision, however, conveys comprehensiveness and is not compatible 
with the proposition that the immunity from arrest of Heads of State is excluded 
from it.‖122 
The Court also stated that reliance by state parties on immunities or special 
procedural rules to circumvent cooperation with the ICC would create “an 
insurmountable obstacle to the Court‘s ability to exercise its jurisdiction”.123 Although 
South Africa failed to comply with the ICC request, the Court, in its discretion, 
decided not to refer the matter to the Assembly of State Parties or to the UN Security 
Council.  
In chapter three the role and influence that the AU has on its member states‟ 
compliance with the Rome Statute will be discussed in more detail. There is no doubt 
that the AU is an influential and powerful organisation. With a large percentage of its 
members also state parties to the Rome Statute, the AU is in a position to play a 
positive role in ensuring implementation of the Rome Statute. However the opposite 
seems to be the case at this stage, with the AU actively encouraging its members 
not to adhere to arrest warrants issued by the ICC. Chapter three will discuss the 
current situation in an attempt to clarify the source of the AU‟s animosity towards the 
ICC, and propose solutions to the problem.  
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Chapter 3 
The African Union and its relationship with the International Criminal Court, 
and the influence that relationship has on the successful implementation of 
the Rome Statute 
 
3.1 Introduction  
―The ICC is our court, created through the demand and with overwhelming 
support of African states, governments and civil society alike, to try to overcome 
their own legacies of massive human rights violations, including apartheid, 
genocide and multiple civil conflicts. It is time to tell those who complain that the 
Court is targeting Africa that the true position is that it is rather African victims 
who are accessing their Court in pursuit of justice. This is especially true when 
we remember that the ICC is a court of last resort which only intervenes where 
states are either unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute serious crimes 
according to the principle of complementarity. There is a simple answer to 
African states that feel ‗targeted‘ by the ICC to address the situation: Prosecute 
atrocity crimes occurring in your territories or committed by your nationals and 
deliver justice to the victims at home‖.124 
Any study into complementarity by African countries would not be complete without 
evaluating the dynamics of the relationship between the ICC, AU and Africa, and the 
factors that shape and influence this relationship. The biggest challenge faced by 
African countries with regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute seems to be 
of a political nature, however there are also legal challenges hampering its 
implementation.  There is a general perception that the ICC is biased against African 
countries when it comes to the prosecution of perpetrators. This perception is fuelled 
by the fact that only African cases have been brought before the ICC even though 
the ICC is seized with jurisdiction over all countries, whether they are state parties or 
not. It should be kept in mind that the current investigations by the OTP all relate to 
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referrals from the respective African countries,125 which include the situations in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the Central African Republic.  
It has been suggested that the current tension is not actually between the AU and 
the ICC, but rather between the AU and the UN Security Council, and that the ICC is 
actually just a casualty of that war,126 and that it would be in the best interest of both 
the AU and the ICC if they collaborated with each other. After all, the Constitutive Act 
of the AU states that  
―We, Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization 
of African Unity is conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa 
constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the 
continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a 
prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda, 
… and determined to promote and protect human and people‘s rights, 
consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance 
and the rule of law…‖.127  
It is clear from the above that almost all African states share the same vision of 
peace, democracy and the protection of human rights. One can therefore assume 
that African states should encourage the workings of the ICC, and actively support 
its efforts to put an end to impunity of the perpetrators of crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole and thus contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes. Yet currently, this is not the case.  In this chapter, the study will explore the 
nature of the tension between the AU and the ICC, and how it might be resolved to 
ensure accountability of perpetrators of international crimes, and to realise the goals 
of both the AU and the ICC in harmony with each other.128 
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3.2 Complementarity in Africa  
As stated earlier, the majority of cases currently before the ICC involve situations in 
African countries or perpetrators from African countries. As the ICC is a court of last 
resort, it would be logical to assume that the complementarity principle is not 
effectively administered by African state parties, yet studies have shown that the 
problem is not always necessarily due to a lack of capacity or priority of 
investigations and prosecutions, but that it can also be attributed to politics and 
diplomacy between African states.129 According to Savelsberg, diplomacy differs 
from justice in that it is oriented towards substantive outcomes in contrast to the 
procedural orientation of criminal proceedings. More often than not, countries choose 
to follow a diplomatic route rather than use force or legal means in an attempt to 
secure peace in cases where human rights atrocities have been committed. 
Countries are often also cautious in assigning individual blame or responsibility for 
human rights violations, and argue that it would not be helpful in resolving issues and 
ensuring a lasting peace.130 When the ICC therefore proceeds with the prosecution 
of an indicted African statesman it naturally causes tension.  On 12 October 2016, 
Burundi‟s lower house of parliament overwhelmingly voted in favour of withdrawing 
from the Rome Statute.131 The Senate also approved this withdrawal, and on 19 
October 2016, the president of Burundi officially signed the legislation into effect. 
Burundi therefore became the first states party to withdraw from the Rome Statute.  
In October 2015, Kenya also gazetted the International Crimes Repeal Bill, to repeal 
the International Crimes Act of 2008 in its entirety. These actions could in all 
probability lead to more withdrawals from the Rome Statute by African countries, and 
would be the end result of the current factious relationship between the AU and the 
ICC.   
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3.3 Political Challenges  
The following “political” challenges have been identified, which have an influence on 
the implementation of the Rome Statute. They are:  
a. The seemingly afro-focused prosecutorial approach by the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the Security Council‟s perceived double standard,  
b. The apparent scuttling of peace projects implemented by the AU, by the ICC 
and the UN Security Council, the “peace versus justice debate”.  
 
3.3.1  Is the ICC unfairly targeting African leaders and/or situations for                                                                                                                                                      
prosecution? The ―Selective Prosecution Theory‖ and the Security Council‘s 
perceived double standard.  
There is a growing perception that the ICC is very selective in deciding who should 
be prosecuted. Prosecutorial discretion is found in all criminal legal systems, and is 
not inherently wrong. The problem identified here is that political influence should not 
play a part when that discretion is applied by the OTP in deciding who should be 
investigated and prosecuted by the ICC. As stated by Imoedemhe, the question is 
not whether selective prosecution should occur, but rather when that selective 
prosecution would become unacceptable.132 This is one of the main frustrations 
African states have with the ICC, as they feel that only African situations are brought 
before the court.133 This so-called selective justice has been a contentious issue 
since the inception of the first international criminal tribunals of Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, where only Nazi and Japanese officials were prosecuted, despite the fact that 
the victorious Allied Powers also committed war crimes. Eberechi argues that this 
paradox fuels the legacy of impunity, and lends credit to the AU‟s argument that the 
enforcement of international criminal justice by the ICC has been selective, targeting 
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only Africans.134 It has even been suggested that international criminal justice has 
become the new instrument of colonisation.135 Currently no African country is a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, and can therefore not veto a 
decision to refer a situation to the ICC. This is in stark contrast to the United States 
of America, whom, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can veto 
any potential investigation it believes would affect its national interests. One of the 
purported reasons given by the United States for its refusal to become a state party 
to the Rome Statute is that it is of the view that Article 12 of the Rome Statute 
threatens its sovereignty, in that the ICC would be able to exercise jurisdiction over 
American service personnel for human rights violations allegedly committed by them 
in the territory of a state party or a state that chose to refer the case to the ICC.136  
The United States argues that as the ICC is a treaty based court, its jurisdiction must 
be tied to the consent of a state expressed either by ratification of the Rome Statute 
or on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the Vienna Convention.  
Du Plessis however states that selectively punishing individuals, whether they are 
political leaders, high ranking military officers or just ordinary soldiers transforms the 
ICC into an instrument through which individual accountability for mass human rights 
violations is internalised as part of the fabric of the international society, thereby 
sending out a message that no one is immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC, and 
that impunity will no longer be acceptable.137 He argues that the ICC is a court by 
and for Africans, and that this is reflected in not only the composition of the ICC, but 
also in the contributions by African states that led to the formation of the court. Du 
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Plessis states that through Article 14 of the Rome Statute, Uganda, The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, have made use of the self-
referral mechanism, allowing the ICC to establish jurisdiction in those instances. 
Furthermore the OTP is slow to initiate an investigation into a situation in terms of 
Article 15, and follows a strict guideline provided for in the Rome Statute. The pre-
trial chamber also has an oversight of the prosecutor‟s decisions, and decisions to 
prosecute or not to only become final when confirmed by the chamber.138  
A further concern for the AU is the double standard employed by the UN Security 
Council with specific regard to the council‟s powers to either refer or defer a situation 
in terms of Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute. It has been pointed out that, for 
instance, the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC by the council, yet human 
rights abuses by Israel against the Palestinians have not been referred, due to the 
fact that certain members of the council are well disposed towards Israel.139 Du 
Plessis correctly states that the uneven political landscape of the UN Security 
Council has become a problem for the ICC. Yet despite this, a referral by the 
Security Council does allow the ICC the ability to ensure a measure of justice for the 
victims of serious crimes committed anywhere in the world.  
 
3.3.2 The scuttling of peace projects implemented by the AU by the ICC and the UN 
Security Council: The peace versus justice debate. 
Certain scholars are of the view that reconciliation and peace efforts should be 
preferred instead of retributive justice meted out to perpetrators of international 
crimes by a prosecution in terms of the Rome Statute, whether that prosecution is in 
a domestic court or by the ICC.140 This is especially the case in countries that have 
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just emerged from a civil conflict or war. In this regard, peace and national 
reconciliation, as opposed to international justice, should be weighed up against 
each other. Settling conflict and establishing regional peace is a central foreign 
policy goal for diplomats, but can this goal be reconciled with the legal recourse 
victims of human rights violations are entitled to in terms of the Rome Statute? The 
AU maintains that certain situations are too serious and too complex to be resolved 
―without recourse to a harmonised approach to justice and peace, neither of which 
should be pursued at the expense of the other‖.141 From the aforementioned it is 
clear that the AU is of the view that African solutions should be applied to African 
problems, and that the ICC is undermining peace efforts in the region by proceeding 
with investigations regarding African situations.  According to Mangu, reconciliation 
is not a function of a criminal tribunal, whether that tribunal is a domestic or an 
international one. 142 An ICC prosecution of African war criminals is however seen to 
be disturbing efforts by the AU to obtain post conflict peace and reconciliation. An 
example of this is Uganda, which initially referred some cases to the ICC, but at a 
later stage requested the court to defer the prosecutions in order to assist that 
country‟s effort to preserve peace and national reconciliation. The UN Security 
Council and the OTP refused a request from the AU to defer investigations, or to 
withdraw charges against President Kenyatta and his vice-president William Ruto.143 
Another example is the Darfur crisis and the arrest warrant issued against president 
Al-Bashir. The goal of the Rome Statute is however not to assist in peace efforts or 
to reconcile former enemies, but to put a stop to impunity.144  
Justice must be a precondition to lasting peace, but one should keep in mind that the 
two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The challenge is to facilitate 
both in a manner that is beneficial to everyone. Abovementioned has been termed 
as the “peace versus justice debate”, each with its proponents and detractors.145 Du 
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Plessis states that in Africa, post-conflict peace building is undermined by the fact 
that there is a widespread lack of accountability on the part of those individuals 
responsible for the continent‟s numerous violent conflicts and that this pervasive 
culture of impunity often threatens any attempt at a lasting peace process, mainly 
because the perpetrators remain free to commit further atrocities, but also because 
impunity fuels a desire for revenge, which leads to even more conflict and further 
violence, thereby starting the vicious cycle all over again.146 Du Plessis goes on to 
state that true and lasting peace requires a commitment to justice, and that the two 
imperatives may, and should operate side by side.147 Under the Rome Statute 
regime there exists a presumption in favour of prosecuting an individual, and that a 
deferral of a situation should only be considered when made in good faith, and if 
backed up with evidence that in terms of the principle of complementarity, state 
parties will in fact ensure that a perpetrator will be prosecuted.148 In the case of 
Sudan and the warrant issued against president Al-Bashir, the issue is complex. If a 
deferral of the situation is granted, what would happen next? There is no credible 
evidence to support an assertion that there are any serious efforts to establish peace 
in Sudan, nor that the perpetrators of human rights abuses will be prosecuted, either 
in a domestic court in Sudan, or by an African state party to the Rome Statute.  
 
3.4  Legal Challenges 
Imoedemhe is of the view that the current hostility between the AU and the ICC is 
also a result of the evolving legal principles governing international criminal law and 
the interpretation of those principles and international customary law, which is 
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sometimes very difficult to prove.149 Disputes over the existence of a customary rule 
often features prominently in international litigation.150  
For the purpose of this study the following two legal challenges have been identified, 
which have an influence on the implementation of the Rome Statute in Africa. They 
are: 
a. The ICC‟s jurisdiction, with specific reference to states that are not a party 
to the Rome Statute, 
b. Head of state immunity, and whether the ICC can in fact prosecute a 
sitting head of state.  
 
3.4.1  The ICC‘s jurisdiction, with specific reference to states that are not a 
      party to the Rome Statute.  
3.4.1.1 The ICC‟s jurisdiction in general.  
One of the most controversial aspects of the ICC is also one of the aspects that is 
most critical for the proper functioning of the court: its jurisdictional range.151 As 
already alluded to in paragraph 2.3.1 of Chapter 2, international law recognises 
different bases for the establishment of jurisdiction by a court. They include ratione 
tertiss, ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis.152 
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute defines the court‟s jurisdiction ratione materiae, by 
stating that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.153 Article 5 of the Rome Statute is 
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phrased specifically to limit the court‟s jurisdiction to only the crimes specified by the 
statute.  
Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute states that: ―The Court shall have jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to this Statute”. The court‟s jurisdiction ratione personae 
only applies to individuals. Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute then goes on to define 
under which circumstances such an individual shall incur criminal responsibility and 
be liable for punishment. Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute further gives 
recognition to the principle of active personality by stating that the court may only 
exercise jurisdiction in a matter where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a state 
party, or if the state from which he is a national has consented to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.  
Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute establishes jurisdiction ratione tertiis for the ICC, 
and states that the court shall have jurisdiction over international crimes, if those 
crimes were committed on the territory of a state party, or if it was committed on 
board an aircraft or vessel which has been registered in a state party.  
The principle of non-retroactivity in international law states that a state is only bound 
by the provisions of a treaty after the date the treaty enters into force .154 Jurisdiction 
ratione temporis by the ICC is reflected in Article 11(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute 
which states that  
―The court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry 
into force of this statute‖ and ―If a state becomes a party to this statute after its 
entry into force, the court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
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committed after the entry into force of this statute for that state, unless that state 
has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3‖.155 
 
3.4.1.2 The ICC‟s jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties  
There are various treaties that establish universal jurisdiction over individuals 
accused of perpetrating international crimes of grave concern to the international 
community as whole.156 The vast majority of states do in fact recognise the concept 
of universal jurisdiction and the validity thereof, because those states are themselves 
parties to one or more conventions that provide for it.157 A contentious issue 
however, is the power of the ICC to establish jurisdiction over an individual who is a 
national of a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute.  In this regard, the warrant 
of arrest issued by the ICC against President Al-Bashir is a good example of how the 
court is able to establish jurisdiction in such an event. The warrant of arrest issued 
by the ICC against President Al-Bashir stems from the intervention by the UN 
Security Council who, on 30 July 2004, declared the situation in western Sudan a 
threat to international peace and security under resolution 1556 calling upon Sudan 
to immediately fulfil all commitments made to facilitate international relief for the 
humanitarian disaster in that region and to disarm the Janjaweed militia and to 
apprehend their leaders and associates whom  incited and carried out human rights 
violations.158 The Sudanese government however failed to adhere to the 
abovementioned Resolution, necessitating that the UN Security Council adopt 
Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005, referring the matter to the ICC for 
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investigation.159 As a general rule, the Rome Statute is not binding on a non-states 
party and cannot create an obligation on such a state without their consent.160 Sudan 
is however a United Nations member state and the UN Charter is therefore 
applicable to Sudan.161 Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of 
the Charter are therefore binding on Sudan.162 The effect of Security Council 
Resolution 1593 was thus that Sudan was treated as a party to the Rome Statute 
even though it never gave consent to be bound.163 Sudan objected to the situation, 
but the ICC proceeded to institute an investigation, and eventually in July 2008, the 
ICC prosecutor filed charges against President Al-Bashir for genocide, crimes 
against humanity and murder. On 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a 
warrant of arrest against President Al-Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes but ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support charges of 
genocide. However on 12 July 2010, a second warrant of arrest was issued against 
President Al-Bashir for charges of genocide.164  
El-Masri argues that the warrants issued against President Al-Bashir were legal in 
terms of international law principles.165 The first argument is that the matter was 
referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council acting in terms of Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, when it issued Resolution 1593, thereby negating Sudan‟s 
non-membership to the Rome Statute. Article 2(1) of the Charter states that ―the 
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Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members‖  
and Article 2(7) 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll ‖.  
These two provisions, when read together, ensure that guaranteeing a state‟s 
sovereignty is subject to the UN Security Council taking a decision under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. The effect of Resolution 1593 is that it not only overrides Sudan‟s 
sovereignty as a non-states party to the Rome Statute, but it also has the effect of 
being binding on all UN member states. The second argument is that international 
law requires that crimes that threaten international peace and security should be 
punished.166 These crimes constitute an obligatio erga omnes, and all states are 
therefore obligated to act.167 This duty to act by states is included in many treaties 
and is considered international customary law therefore binding all states, even if 
they are not a party to some of the mentioned treaties.168 The third and last 
argument is that Sudan‟s continued defiance and refusal to institute an independent 
investigation and prosecution of responsible individuals, allows the ICC, in terms of 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute, to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. Hence Sudan‟s 
failure to act allowed the ICC to invoke the principle of complementarity.169 Article 18 
of the Rome Statute, which deals with the procedures for admissibility, only 
encompasses cases referred to the ICC by state parties or cases which have been 
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initiated by the Prosecutor and specifically exempts cases referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council. Article 19 of the Rome Statute, which governs the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, is silent on whether its provisions would apply to Security Council referrals. Be 
that as it may, the Darfur Special Criminal Court established by Sudan to prosecute 
individuals responsible for the atrocities, could only be described as a farce, and not 
a genuine effort to show that Sudan was willing and able to investigate and 
prosecute individuals.170  
Sudan objected to the ICC‟s jurisdiction on the grounds that Sudan‟s not being a 
state party to the Rome Statute meant that the ICC had no jurisdiction in the matter. 
However Security Council referrals to the ICC do not require personal or territorial 
jurisdiction. The only real challenge Sudan has to the ICC‟s jurisdiction is that it is 
genuinely carrying out proceedings of its own, which has already been proven to be 
virtually non-existent.171 Realising their predicament, the Sudanese government 
attempted to portray the ICC as a neo-colonial Western power targeting African 
leaders for prosecution, which attempt seems to have found fertile ground in the 
shape of the AU. 
 
3.4.2  Head of state immunity and whether the ICC can in fact prosecute a sitting 
head of state: The Al-Bashir challenge.  
3.4.2.1Immunity and head of state immunity.  
The rules granting immunity from criminal responsibility can be classified in two 
broad categories, namely the rules applicable under international law and those that 
are provided for in a state‟s domestic legislation.172 As discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 
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in Chapter 2 of the study, international law recognises two types of immunity. 
Immunity of state officials ratione personae, being immunity attached to an office or 
status held by an official, and secondly, immunity of state officials ratione materiae, 
being immunity attached to official acts performed by officials.  
Even though Article 27 cannot remove the immunity enjoyed by a head of state 
under customary international law by a non-states party, the fact that the situation in 
Sudan was referred under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to the ICC, ipso facto 
removed the head of state immunity enjoyed by President Al-Bashir. As explained in 
the abovementioned paragraph, Sudan was treated as a state party to the Rome 
Statute.173 According to Ssenyonjo, Resolution 1593 implicitly revoked President Al-
Bashir‟s immunity when it stated that  
―…the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that states not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all states and 
concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully‖.174  
Since the ICC issued warrants for the arrest of President Al-Bashir for alleged war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and later for genocide committed in Darfur, in 
response the AU issued a number of decisions175  calling on all AU member states 
not to cooperate with the ICC regarding the arrest and surrender of President Al-
Bashir. Many academic writers176  are in agreement that it was the act of issuing an 
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arrest warrant against a sitting head of state that sparked the AU‟s fierce reaction. 
The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the Security Council failed to 
respond to requests for deferral of proceedings in terms of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, as well as the contentious question of whether a head of state does in fact 
enjoy immunity from prosecution in terms of customary international law. Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute states that: 
―1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to 
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.‖ 
The AU‟s argument is that in terms of Article 98 the ICC cannot force any state to 
arrest and surrender the serving head of state of a non-state party, when that non-
state party has not expressly waived the personal immunity of its head of state. In 
contrast to this, Article 27 of the Rome Statute states that:  
―1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based 
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a 
ground for reduction of sentence. 
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2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.‖ 
In terms of Article 27(2), official immunity cannot be claimed when someone is being 
prosecuted before an international criminal court. It is clear that there exist 
contradictory provisions in the Rome Statute.  
 
3.4.2.2 Can the ICC prosecute a sitting Head of State? 
That President Al-Bashir enjoys legal immunity as head of state is not in dispute, 
what is unclear is the extent of that immunity. Unfortunately there is no international 
treaty to guide one on this subject, and one is reliant on jurisprudence and 
international custom to provide clarity.177 A good example is the matter of R v Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, more 
commonly known as the “Pinochet case‖.178  In this matter the House of Lords ruled 
that former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet did not enjoy immunity ratione 
materiae, and that he could be extradited from Great Brittan to stand trial. However 
following this case, in the matter of Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium, better known as the ―Arrest 
Warrant case”, the International Court of Justice ruled that an indictment for 
committing crimes against humanity could not be used as a basis for waiving 
immunity of current high ranking government officials, and that there was no 
exception, in customary international law, to the absolute immunity that an 
incumbent foreign minister enjoys.179 The court did however state that immunities 
enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former minister for Foreign 
Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances, one of 
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which is before the ICC.180 The Arrest Warrant Case is however distinguishable from 
the matter of President Al-Bashir in that it does not concern a state who wishes to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over another state‟s citizen, but rather the ICC acting 
on a referral by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the Pinochet case dealt with a 
former head of state, whereas the “Arrest Warrant Case‖ related to the immunity of a 
Minister. In this regard the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, in 
the matter of Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, remarked that international 
criminal tribunals are not organs of state, and that they derive their mandate from the 
international community, and are by implication not subject to the principle of state 
immunity.181  The court ruled unanimously that Taylor did not enjoy any immunity 
from prosecution by the court, even though he was the serving head of state of 
Liberia at the time criminal proceedings were instituted against him.182 In paragraph 
53 of the judgment the court stated the following 
“We hold that the official position of the applicant as an incumbent head of state 
at the time when these criminal proceedings were initiated against him is not a 
bar to his prosecution by this court. The applicant was and is subject to criminal 
proceedings before the Special Court for Sierra Leone”.183 
 It is the author‟s view that the Special Court for Sierra Leone adopted the correct 
approach to immunity, contrary to Sudan‟s argument that president Al-Bashir‟s status 
as head of state affords him immunity from prosecution by the ICC in terms of 
customary international law, and that Article 27 of the Rome Statute is not binding on 
him. It is correct that Article 27 of the Rome Statute cannot remove head of state 
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immunity from a non-state party to the Rome Statute, but as discussed above, 
President Al-Bashir‟s immunity was implicitly removed by Security Council 
Resolution 1593. In this regard Ssenyonjo argues that a Security Council referral to 
the ICC would automatically have the effect that an individual would be bound by the 
provisions of the Rome Statute, and more specifically by Article 27 thereof.184 The 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the matter of Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir185 
was also of the view that as a result of UN security Council Resolution 1593,  
―…the Chamber considers that the current position of Omar Al Bashir as head of 
a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no effect on the court's jurisdiction 
over the present case…‖.186  
That the ICC acted legally when issuing arrest warrants against President Al-Bashir 
cannot be disputed, which leads to the next question: Can the ICC request state 
parties to act on the warrants, and to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir, 
perhaps causing that state party to act contrary to its obligations under international 
law, with respect to its obligations towards a third state? 
 
3.4.2.3 Can the ICC request state parties to surrender President Al-Bashir? 
The goal of this study is not to contribute to the debate amongst scholars whether 
Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute are in conflict with each other, and how 
that apparent conflict of norms should be interpreted and applied to the Al-Bashir 
matter. The debate is however relevant to the study in that it is one of the main 
reasons given by the AU when it issued decisions calling on its member states not to 
cooperate with the ICC in arresting and surrendering President Al-Bashir. 
Gaeta is of the view that the conflicting norms between Article 27(2) enunciating the 
irrelevance of head of state immunity on the one hand and Article 98(1) barring the 
ICC from proceeding with a request for the surrender or assistance by a state party 
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of an individual, should the request be inconsistent with the state party‟s obligations 
under international law towards a third state, can easily be solved by construing that 
the words “third state” in Article 98(1) specifically refers to non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute.187 Accordingly, any state party would therefore be acting 
inconsistently with international law by arresting President Al-Bashir, as the 
government of Sudan has not waived Al-Bashir‟s immunity.188 Gaeta goes on to 
state that UN Security Council Resolution 1593 was simply a mechanism designed 
to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC, and that Article 103 of the UN Charter is not 
applicable, as the Resolution obliges Sudan and the other parties to the conflict, to 
cooperate with the ICC, and merely urges all other states to cooperate fully with the 
ICC.189 This legal argument certainly has some merit to it, and it would seem that the 
Rome Statute distinguishes between immunity for the exercise of jurisdiction on the 
one hand and immunity for arrest and surrender of a “third state‟s” officials on the 
other. Accordingly, so the argument goes, Article 27(2) relinquishes all immunities in 
relation to a request by the ICC concerning nationals of a state party, whereas Article 
98(1) would keep intact the immunities enjoyed under customary international law for 
non-state parties.190  
However, on 12 December 2011, the ICC‟s Pre-Trial Chamber made its position on 
the interpretation of Article 98(1) clear when it stated that  
―…the Chamber finds that customary international law creates an exception to 
Head of State immunity when international courts seek a Head of State's arrest 
for the commission of international crimes. There is no conflict between Malawi's 
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obligations towards the Court and its obligations under customary international 
law; therefore, article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply.‖191  
Akande is correct when stating that the purpose of Article 27(2) is to completely 
remove immunity from individuals and that Article 98(1) can therefore not be 
interpreted as allowing state parties to rely on those very same immunities to avoid 
arresting or surrendering an individual, even if that individual is a citizen of a non-
state party.192 Imoedemhe is of the view that immunity should no longer be relevant 
when it comes to the prosecution of international crimes, regardless of whether the 
alleged perpetrator is a past-, or incumbent head of state.193 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
African state parties are in a position to make a meaningful contribution towards the 
evolution of international criminal law in the 21st century. Through their participation 
in the creation of the ICC African states have demonstrated their intent to put a stop 
to impunity and their commitment to ensure that the victims of mass human rights 
atrocities receive justice. The blatant attack on the credibility of the ICC in recent 
years by some African states is unwarranted and should not be encouraged or 
entertained by the AU. It is the responsibility of each state party to the Rome Statute 
to ensure the ICC‟s success through the principle of complementarity.  
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Chapter 4 
Botswana, Kenya and Uganda and the Implementation of the Rome Statute 
 
4.1 Introduction  
―…I am an African. I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. The pain 
of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, and of Somalia, of the Sudan, of 
Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear. The dismal shame of poverty, suffering 
and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share…. The 
evolution of humanity says that Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise 
from the ashes. Whatever the setbacks of the moment, nothing can stop us now! 
Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace!‖194 
The idea of an African Renaissance was first captured in a series of essays written 
by Cheikh Anta Diop, a Senegalese historian.195 The concept of an African 
Renaissance entails the belief that Africa as a whole must overcome the current 
challenges facing the continent to achieve cultural, scientific and economic renewal. 
To achieve these goals, peace, stability and accountability is a must, as it will create 
the necessary environment for Africa to prosper.196  The adoption of legislation to 
give effect to the commitment by African state parties to the Rome Statute must 
therefore receive the necessary attention and resources it requires. However, at a 
grassroots level, a state party generally has more specific short term goals when 
adopting implementation legislation. The first goal relates to criminal law, which 
includes punishment, deterrence and crime prevention. According to Shany, these 
goals are often referred to collectively as “bringing an end to impunity”.197 Secondly, 
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 Excerpt from the famous speech entitled “I am an African” delivered by former President Thabo 
Mbeki in parliament on 8 May 1996, during the adoption of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa.  
195
 Diop C.A Towards the African renaissance: essays in African culture & development, 1946-1960 
(Karnak House, London, 1996).  
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 In this regard also see article by: Nmehielle V.O “The African Union and African Renaissance: A 
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political goals, for the state to internally promote peace, stability and reconciliation as 
well as to achieve external political coherence with other countries, and thirdly, legal 
goals to develop a country‟s national laws and the application of international 
criminal law by that country. This chapter will investigate the progress made, and 
also the challenges faced by Botswana, Kenya and Uganda regarding the 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 
implementation legislation of each country will also be tested against that of South 
Africa, which was used as the benchmark for implementation legislation in this study.  
 
4.2 Botswana  
4.2.1 Introduction  
Botswana gained independence on 30 September 1966, after the country‟s first 
general election was held with Sir Seretse Khama as its first president. The 
Constitution of Botswana is the supreme law of the country.198 As in South Africa, 
Botswana is a common law country and the sources of law include customary law, 
legislation (Botswana makes use of a Penal Code) and judicial precedent.199 
Botswana has a dualist legal system,200 therefore all international agreements and 
conventions acceded to by Botswana will only acquire force of law once it has been 
domesticated and incorporated into Botswana‟s legislation.201  
Botswana signed the Rome Statute on 8 September 2000, and deposited its 
instrument of ratification on the same day, thereby becoming the fifth African state to 
do so. Botswana has always been a staunch supporter of the ICC, and in recent 
                                                                                                                                       
International Criminal Tribunals wish to achieve. Those categories are also applicable to states when 
deciding to become a States Party to the Rome Statute. 
198
 The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana 1966, as amended. 
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 The Botswana Penal Code as amended. 
200
 Sir H Lauterpacht defines a dualist legal system as follows: ―according to the dualist view, 
international and municipal law differ so radically in the matter of subjects of law, its sources and its 
substance, that a rule of international law can never per se become part of the law of the land; it must 
be made so by the express or implied authority of the state. Thus conceived, the dualist view is 
merely a manifestation of the traditional positivist attitude‖.  
201
 Part IV, Sections 86 to 89 of the Botswana Constitution of 1966 as amended.  
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years has clearly stated that they are committed to arrest Al Bashir or any other 
person charged by the ICC.202 
 
4.2.2 The legal challenges facing Botswana in implementing the Rome Statute 
As with all states Botswana also faces some hurdles with regard to the 
implementation of the Rome Statute. Sixteen years after ratification, Botswana has 
not yet domesticated the Rome Statute by way of an Act of Parliament. The question 
has to be asked why? Dinokopila identified some of the most pressing issues that 
would require attention from the state in order for Botswana to fully domesticate the 
Rome Statute.203 They are as follows:  
4.2.2.1 Dualist State    
Botswana is a dualist state and all treaties signed by Botswana do not automatically 
become law in that country, meaning that even after signing the Rome Statute, the 
treaty has no real power in Botswana. The treaty may however be used to assist with 
the interpretation of the law of Botswana by the courts.204  
4.2.2.2 Penal Code   
Botswana‟s criminal law has been codified in the Botswana Penal Code. When one 
looks at the penal code, it becomes clear that the law is severely underdeveloped 
when it comes to the prosecution of international crimes, and more specifically the 
crimes set out in the Rome Statute. The penal code makes no provision for the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or aggression. Botswana‟s laws do 
however provide for the prosecution of war crimes, and since 1970, courts in 
Botswana have jurisdiction to try war crimes under the Geneva Conventions 
Act,205which domesticated the Geneva Conventions of 1949. A further hindrance is 
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 http://www.mofaic.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=655:icc-lauds-
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 Dinokopila B.R “The prosecution and punishment of international crimes in Botswana” 2009, 
Journal for International Criminal Justice, Volume 7, Pages 1077-1085.  
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Section 10(8) of the Constitution of Botswana that states: ―No person shall be 
convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefor 
is prescribed in a written law…‖. Although this section of the Constitution ensures 
legal certainty, it does however prevent the prosecution of international crimes in 
Botswana that haves not been provided for in their penal code. It also prevents the 
prosecution of international crimes that may have been committed prior to the 
domestication of the Rome Statute in Botswana.  
A further problem will occur when a fugitive accused of committing international 
crimes is arrested in Botswana on request of another state party. Currently the 
extradition process in Botswana is governed by their Extradition Act206 as well as 
various extradition agreements with other countries, for instance South Africa. 
Section 8(1)(h) of the Botswana Extradition Act provides for double criminality. 
According to Dugard ―the principle of double criminality requires that the conduct 
claimed to constitute an extraditable crime should constitute a crime in both the 
requesting and the requested state‖.207 Where no provision is made in Botswana‟s 
law for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or aggression, a perpetrator 
                                                                                                                                       
(1) Any person, whatever his nationality, who, whether in or outside Botswana, commits, or aids, 
abets or procures the commission by any other person of, any such grave breach of any of the 
scheduled conventions as is referred to in the following articles respectively of those conventions, that 
is to say- 
(a)     article 50 of the convention set out in the First Schedule; 
(b)     article 51 of the convention set out in the Second Schedule; 
(c)     article 130 of the convention set out in the Third Schedule; or 
(d)     article 147 of the convention set out in the Fourth Schedule, 
shall be guilty of an offence and- 
(i)     in the case of such a grave breach as aforesaid involving the wilful killing of a person protected 
by the convention in question, shall be sentenced to death or to imprisonment; 
 (ii)     in the case of any other such grave breach as aforesaid, shall be liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 14 years. 
(2) In the case of an offence under this section committed outside Botswana, a person may be 
proceeded against, indicted, tried and punished therefor in any place in Botswana as if the offence 
had been committed in that place. 
(3) A magistrate's court shall have no jurisdiction to try an offence under this section, and criminal 
proceedings for such an offence shall not be instituted except by or on behalf of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. 
(4) If in proceedings under this section in respect of a grave breach of any of the scheduled 
conventions any question arises under article 2 of such convention (which relates to the 
circumstances in which the convention applies) that question shall be determined by the President 
and a certificate purporting to set out any such determination and to be signed by or on behalf of the 
President shall be received in evidence and be deemed to be so signed without further proof, unless 
the contrary is shown. 
(5) Charges of offences under this section shall not be triable by court-martial. 
206
 Chapter: 09:03 of the Penal Code. 
207
 Dugard J et al International law: A South African Perspective 4th Edition (Juta, Cape Town, 2011). 
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arrested in Botswana cannot be extradited to another state party that does have 
implementation legislation in place. 208  
In order to overcome some of the anticipated problems certain pieces of legislation 
will have to be amended, they include the Penal Code, The Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act and The Extradition Act.  
4.2.2.3 Immunity from prosecution.  
Section 41(1) of the Constitution states as follows:  
―Protection of President in respect of legal proceedings 
(1) Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the office of President 
no criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official capacity or in his 
private capacity and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in 
respect of which relief is claimed against him in respect of anything done or 
omitted to be done in his private capacity. 
(2) Where provision is made by law limiting the time within which proceedings of 
any description may be brought against any person, the term of any person in 
the office of President shall not be taken into account in calculating any period of 
time prescribed by that law which determines whether any such proceedings as 
are mentioned in subsection (1) of this section may be brought against that 
person.‖  
This section of the Constitution may contradict Article 27 of the Rome Statute,209 and 
the domestication of the Rome Statute may therefore involve amending the 
Constitution of Botswana.  
4.2.2.4 Jurisdiction of Botswana‟s Courts.  
Chapter 08:01 Section 4 of the Penal Code states that ―The jurisdiction of the courts 
of Botswana for the purposes of this Code extends to every place within Botswana‖. 
                                            
208
 Extradition Treaty Between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Botswana, signed on 
2 May 1969, as amended. Home Affairs and others v Tsebe and others and Ex Parte Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development and another v Tsebe 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC). Further relevant 
is the SADC Protocol on Extradition to which Botswana is also a signatory.  
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 Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute that states ―Immunities or special procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the 
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person‖  
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It would therefore seem that courts in Botswana do not exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. There are however some exceptions to this rule, for instance, crimes 
committed outside the territory of Botswana that are punishable offences under the 
National Security Act and the Geneva Conventions Act.210  
4.2.2.5 Lack of Experience   
Lack of experience with regard to the prosecution in Botswana of international 
crimes is another challenge. According to Dinokopila and Stone, there has never 
been a prosecution in Botswana of a perpetrator accused of committing an 
international crime, nor has Botswana ever arrested a suspect, upon request by the 
ICC.211 Botswana will therefore have to embark on a massive capacity building 
exercise in order to train prosecutors and judges, to enable them to prosecute 
international crimes.  
4.2.2.6 Bilateral Immunity Agreements   
Botswana signed a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States, which 
prevents Botswana from extraditing American citizens. The treaty has however not 
yet been domesticated in Botswana.  
4.2.2.7 Lack of Infrastructure and Financial Resources   
Lack of infrastructure and financial resources to domesticate the Rome Statute is the 
biggest stumbling block for Botswana.  
4.2.2.8 Capital Punishment in Botswana.  
In terms of Section 26(1) of the Botswana Penal Code, ―When any person is 
sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he shall be hanged by the neck 
until he is dead…‖. Section 4(1) of the Constitution states ―No person shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in 
respect of an offence under the law in force in Botswana of which he has been 
convicted‖. The death penalty in Botswana is therefore constitutionally mandated 
and protected. Currently a convicted person can be sentenced to death for any of the 
                                            
210
 Chapter 23:01 of the Penal Code of Botswana, The National Security Act, Section 16, and The 
Geneva Conventions Act, 28 of 1970, Section 3. 
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 https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=pr1164  (Accessed on 30 October 2017).  
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following crimes, namely premeditated murder, treason, espionage, military offences 
and piracy.212 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill states that 
any person in Botswana or elsewhere who has been convicted of crimes against 
humanity, is liable to receive the death penalty, unless extenuating circumstances 
have been proved by the convicted person. This may place Botswana in a difficult 
position, as it is unforeseeable that a state party would willingly surrender a person 
to Botswana knowing that he or she might receive the death penalty if convicted. The 
only way around this problem would be for the Botswana government to provide said 
state party with an assurance that the death penalty will not be sought, or, if 
convicted, that the death penalty will not be imposed.  
As far as South Africa is concerned, in the Constitutional Court judgement of Minister 
of Home Affairs and others v Tsebe and others and Ex Parte Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and another v Tsebe 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC)213 delivered 
on 27 July 2012, it was held that in accordance with section 7(2) of the Constitution, 
the Government is under an obligation not to deport, extradite or in any way transfer 
a person to a country where the death penalty is a possible sentence unless 
sufficient assurances are given that the death penalty will not be imposed, or if 
imposed not carried out.214 
4.2.2.9 Proliferation of Treaty Obligations   
In recent years there have also been a proliferation of treaty obligations, which 
further strain the available resources of the government.  
 
4.2.3 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill, Bill No. 22 of 2014 
On 16 July 2014, the Minister of Defence Justice and Security tabled the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill, Bill No. 22 of 2014, in Botswana‟s 
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National Assembly. Currently the Bill‟s technical details are being refined in order to 
present the Bill to Botswana‟s Parliament.  The aim of the Bill is to provide for the 
domestication of the Rome Statute and to give effect to Botswana‟s obligations as a 
State Party.  
The Bill sets out crimes for which Botswana‟s courts will have jurisdiction, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Bill also clearly states in 
which instances national courts will have jurisdiction to try offences committed 
outside the borders of Botswana. These three instances include: where the 
perpetrator is a citizen or permanent resident of Botswana, where the offence has 
been committed against a citizen or permanent resident of Botswana, or, where the 
perpetrator is present in Botswana after the commission of the alleged offence.  
 
Part III of the Bill deals with cooperation and assistance to the ICC with regard to the 
investigation and prosecution of persons alleged to have committed international 
crimes.  
 
Part IV of the Bill deals with the arrest and surrender of persons alleged to have 
committed international crimes, and also includes provisions dealing with the 
consensual surrender of an accused person, as well as the rights of such a person.    
 
Part VI of the Bill deals with the enforcement of sentences and also includes a 
provision for the transfer of a prisoner to the ICC or to another state party to 
complete his or her sentence, or for the enforcement of a sentence. 
 
Part VII of the Bill deals with investigations by the ICC and the sitting of the ICC in 
Botswana.  
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4.2.4 How does Botswana‘s legislation compare with that of South Africa?  
As mentioned above, Botswana and South Africa‟s legal systems have a common 
source, namely Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English law. These sources of 
law are applied in conjunction with legislation and judicial decisions. Although a 
divergence of the two countries‟ legal systems have taken place over the years, 
Botswana‟s legal system is still influenced and shaped by South African legal 
practice.215 South African judicial decisions and academic works are regarded as 
authoritative in Botswana.216 For this reason it is suggested that any judicial decision 
pronounced in South Africa relating to the interpretation of the Rome Statute and its 
implementation legislation could be used by Botswana as authority, and vice versa. 
Comparing Botswana‟s Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Bill with 
South Africa‟s ICC Act to evaluate Botswana‟s Bill, the author found the Bill to be 
comprehensive and detailed, providing for domestic prosecution as well as 
cooperation with the ICC. The legal history shared by both countries should be seen 
as an advantage as there is still a measure of coherence between the two systems 
which could prove very useful when working together to stop impunity in Africa.  
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4.2.5 Conclusion  
Abovementioned Bill was passed by the Botswana Parliament during 2017, enabling 
the country to fulfil its obligations in terms of the Rome Statute.217 
 
4.3 Kenya  
4.3.1 Introduction 
Kenya‟s legal system consists of both statutory and English common law, mixed with 
elements of tribal and Islamic law.218 Kenya‟s first constitution was enacted on 12 
December 1963, and the third and latest constitution was promulgated on 27 August 
2010219. Section 2(6) of the Constitution states that “…Any treaty or convention 
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution…‖, 
therefore in effect making Kenya a monist legal state. This is a radical departure 
from Kenya‟s previous constitution which required that all treaties or conventions first 
had to be translated into national law through the enactment of domestic 
legislation.220  
Kenya became a signatory to the Rome Statute on 11 August 1999, and deposited 
its instrument of ratification on 15 March 2005, becoming the 98th States Party. 
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Kenya, Revised Edition 2016 [2012]), which states:  
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 of August 1897, common law and the doctrine of equality, African customary law, 
Islamic law and lastly, International Instruments.   
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Kenya adopted the International Crimes Act 2008,221 which came into force on 1 
January 2009, thereby domesticating the Rome Statute. However, during October 
2015, the government of Kenya gazetted the International Crimes Repeal Bill, to 
repeal the abovementioned piece of legislation in its entirety. President Kenyatta 
claimed in the media that the reason for this was to enable Kenya to deal with 
international crimes at a domestic level.222 The Bill has been read in Kenya‟s 
National Assembly and was thereafter referred to the Justice and Legal Affairs 
Committee, who was tasked with preparing a report, before the Bill is debated.  
On 27 December 2007, a general election took place in Kenya, and on 30 December 
2007, the Electoral Board announced Mwai Kibaki as the winner. Immediately after 
the announcement, supporters of his opponent, Raila Odinga, claimed that there had 
been electoral manipulation leading to protests and riots throughout Kenya. The 
government‟s response was swift and severe, resulting in the killing and wounding of 
hundreds of people and gross human rights violations.223 This was followed by with 
even more ethnic violence in the Rift Valley. According to estimates by the Waki 
Commission, 1 133 people were killed and more than 600 000 people were internally 
displaced due to the violence that took place in the period between 27 December 
2007 and the end of February 2008.224 The violence also led to the OTP 
investigating cases.225 These cases were referred to the ICC by the Prosecutor who 
opened an investigation proprio motu with the authorization of Pre-Trial Chamber II 
on 11 March 2010, after it became clear that the government of Kenya would not 
fulfil its mandate as a state party to the Rome Statute by investigating and 
prosecuting individuals responsible for the perpetration of gross human rights 
                                            
221
 The International Crimes Act 2008, Act No. 16 of 2008.  
222
 Njagi J “Kenya moves closer to pulling out of ICC” http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Kenya-
moves-closer-to-pulling-out-of-ICC/1064-3240412-4n5a8vz/index.html (Accessed on 20 October 
2016).  
223
 See footnote hereunder, Waki Commission Report page 304 relating to the extent and 
consequences of the post-election violence in Kenya.  
224
 The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (Also known as the Waki Commission, due 
to the fact that Justice Philip Waki Chaired the commission), was an international commission of 
inquiry established by the Government of Kenya to investigate the post-election violence in Kenya 
during 2007-2008. The main recommendation of the commission was that a Special Tribunal be 
created to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for human rights abuses that were 
perpetrated.  The commission‟s report is available at: 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.p
df, (Accessed on 21 August 2017).  
225
 In this regard also see the Waki Commission report, and the recommendations made therein. The 
report can be accessed at:  http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf  
77 
 
violations.226 227 The then prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, proceeded to 
seek indictments for six suspects accused of crimes against humanity, and on 8 
March 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued summonses.228 The six individuals that 
were indicted became colloquially known as the “Ocampo six”.229 In December 2014, 
ICC Prosecutor withdrew charges of crimes against humanity against President 
Kenyatta, citing a lack of evidence.230 Kenya is however in a position to practice 
positive complementarity and to prosecute the individuals responsible, although 
there is no political will to do so.  
 
4.3.2 The International Crimes Act 2008 
As previously stated, the International Crimes Act came into force on 1 January 
2009, by a Notice published in the Kenya Government Gazette.231 The Act makes 
provision for all aspects covered by the Rome Statute, which includes the 
criminalisation of the relevant international crimes, jurisdiction for the prosecution of 
those crimes, admissibility as well as co-operation and judicial assistance. So for 
instance Section 4 of the Act states that certain provisions of the Rome Statute shall 
have “force of law‖ in Kenya, and are therefore incorporated verbatim into the law of 
Kenya.232 The Act can be seen as a powerful tool to ensure complementarity.  
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punishment of certain international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and to enable Kenya to co-operate with the International Criminal Court established by the 
Rome Statute in the performance of its functions…‖.  
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 Section 4(2)(a-i) of the Act.  
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4.3.2.1 Part II of the Act: International crimes and offences against the administration 
of justice  
Section 6 of the Act criminalises genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.233 Section 6 is a very important part of the Act, as it seeks to align Kenyan 
criminal law with that of international law, and allows the Kenyan courts to make use 
of international jurisprudence when interpreting the Act.234 Subsection 2 of Section 
6(2), also provides for conspiracy or attempting to commit the abovementioned 
crimes by an individual or individuals. The crime of conspiracy is therefore an 
independent offence separate and distinct from the commission of any other specific 
substantive crimes provided for in Section 6.235 The section also prescribes the 
relevant punishment if convicted, which may include the death penalty or life 
imprisonment.236 Section 7 of the Act, which relates to general principles of criminal 
law further directly, incorporates for instance Articles 28, 29 and 33 of the Rome 
Statute into Kenyan law. According to Okuta this is very important, as the Kenyan 
Penal Code does not make provision for the notion of command responsibility or 
superior orders.237 Another very important aspect of the Rome Statute that has been 
incorporated into the Act is that of Article 29, which excludes any statute of 
limitations for crimes committed.238 Section 8 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Kenya to try offences in terms of Section 6. Under normal 
circumstances, the courts in Kenya only have jurisdiction over crimes committed 
within the territory of Kenya. Section 8 of the Act however provides for a limited 
universal jurisdiction in the event that at the time of the offence 
                                            
233
 Section 6(4) states that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes shall be ascribed the 
same meaning as per the Rome Statute.  
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 Okuta A “National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya” 2009, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Volume 7, Pages 1063-1076.  
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 In terms of South African Law the offence of conspiracy is also a statutory offence. Section 
18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956 (Act No. 17 of 1956) provides that ―any person 
who…conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit…any offence, 
whether at common law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence 
would be liable‖. 
236
 Section 6(3)(a-b) of the Act. In terms of Article 80 of the Rome Statute, a state party may not be 
prohibited from applying their own prescribed penalties. In the case of Kenya, the death penalty is 
prescribed by Section 204 of the Penal Code. 
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Okuta A “National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya” 2009, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Volume 7, Pages 1063-1076 at page 1066.  
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 Article 29 of the Rome Statute states that ―The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not 
be subject to any statute of limitations‖.  
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―…the person was a Kenyan citizen or was employed by the Government of 
Kenya in a civilian or military capacity; the person was a citizen of a state that 
was engaged in an armed conflict against Kenya, or was employed in a civilian 
or military capacity by such a state; the victim of the alleged offence was a 
Kenyan citizen; or the victim of the alleged offence was a citizen of a state that 
was allied with Kenya in an armed conflict…‖.239  
The Act therefore provides for both active personality jurisdiction as well as passive 
personality jurisdiction. The courts will also have jurisdiction should a suspect, after 
the commission of an offence, be present in the territory of Kenya.240 This however 
entails that the courts will not be able to establish jurisdiction for crimes committed 
outside the territory of Kenya. Despite Section 8 of the Act providing for universal 
jurisdiction, no suspect has to date been indicted on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction in Kenya. This Part of the Act also makes provision for offences against 
the administration of justice and the necessary jurisdiction to try those offences.241 
 
4.3.2.2 Part III of the Act: General provisions relating to requests for assistance  
Part III of the Act makes provision for assistance to the ICC in relation to Part 9 of 
the Rome Statute which deals with international cooperation and judicial assistance 
by state parties. A positive aspect of Part III of the Act is that Section 23(2) makes 
provision for assistance by the Kenyan authorities in a more informal manner, as 
long as the procedure is not prohibited by Kenyan law.242 Section 27(1) of the Act 
provides that immunity or official capacity of an individual shall not constitute a bar 
for the execution of a request, nor the surrender, transfer or removal of that 
individual. The wording of Section 27(1) is however problematic in that it only relates 
to requests for purposes of transfer or surrender of an individual to the ICC. For the 
purpose of prosecuting an individual in Kenya, immunity provided to the president 
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 Section 8(b)(i-iv) of the Act.  
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 Section 8(c) of the Act.  
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 Sections 9 to 17 provides for offences relating to the Bribery of judges and officials, Obstruction of 
justice, the Obstruction of ICC officials, Perjury, Witness giving contradictory evidence, Fabrication of 
evidence, Offences relating to affidavits, Intimidation and the Retaliation against witnesses. 
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 Section 23(2) of the Act states as follows: ―If the request for assistance specifies that it should be 
executed in a particular manner that is not prohibited by Kenyan law or by using a particular 
procedure that is not prohibited by Kenyan law, the Attorney-General or the Minister, as the case may 
be, shall use his best endeavours to ensure that the request is executed in that manner or using that 
procedure, as the case may require.‖.  
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under the Constitution of Kenya will prevail. Section 27(2) states that “Subsection (1) 
shall have effect subject to sections 62 and 115, but notwithstanding any other 
enactment or rule of law…‖. This implies that Section 143 of the Constitution of 
Kenya, which provides the president with protection from legal proceedings, would 
trump Section 27 of the Act.243 Section 143(4) of the Constitution however states that 
―…The immunity of the President under this Article shall not extend to a crime for 
which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and 
which prohibits such immunity…”. This provision however only relates to the 
president, and by failing to incorporate Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute into the Act, 
other important government officials may be free from domestic prosecution.244 245 
 
4.3.2.3 Part IV of the Act: Arrest and surrender of persons to the ICC 
Part IV of the Act sets out the provisions for requesting the arrest and surrender of 
an individual remand and bail as well as the restrictions on the surrender of such 
individual. Upon closer inspection, the powers given to the Minister responsible for 
National Security is disconcerting. Section 31 determines that the Minister may at 
any time, apply to the courts for the cancellation of a warrant of arrest, and that if 
granted, the individual shall be released immediately.246 Section 43 goes on to state 
that once a warrant has been issued by the court, the Minister should then determine 
whether to surrender the individual to the ICC.247 The power entrusted to the Minister 
is however not unique, so, for instance, in South African law, the Minister of Justice, 
in terms of Section 11 of the Extradition Act, 1962 may also order that a perpetrator 
not be surrendered to foreign authorities.248 Article 59(4) of the Rome Statute 
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 Section 143(1) of the Constitution of Kenya states as follows: ―Criminal proceedings shall not be 
instituted or continued in any court against the President or a person performing the functions of that 
office, during their tenure of office”.  
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20110120.pdf  (Accessed on 28 August 2017).  
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 Gevers C “Immunity and implementation legislation in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda” published 
on 22 December 2011, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975788 
,(Accessed on 28 August 2017).  
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 As per Section 31(2) of the Act.  
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 The Minister is however obliged to furnish reasons, should he decide to refuse the surrender of an 
individual.  
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 Section 11 of the Extradition Act 1962 (Act No. 67 of 1962) states as follows:  
The Minister may- 
(a) order any person committed to prison under section 10 to be surrendered to any person 
authorized by the foreign State to receive him or her; or 
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nonetheless states that once a warrant has been issued by the ICC, the states party 
where the individual is in custody may not consider whether the warrant of arrest 
was properly issued in accordance with Article 58(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute. 
Sections 51 and 52 of the Act further provides the Minister with far ranging powers to 
refuse the surrender of an individual or to postpone the execution of the request for 
surrender.  
4.3.2.4 Other related Parts of the Act 
Part V of the Act relates to the local procedures to be followed when receiving a 
request for cooperation, in the location of persons or the provision of items and/or 
obtaining of evidence.249 It also details the procedures for the questioning of 
persons, the serving of documentation, the appearance of witnesses before the court 
and the temporary transfer of prisoners.250 It also prescribes how evidence should be 
collected and preserved, and how property associated with the commission of 
international crimes should be identified, frozen and seized.251 Restrictions on the 
provision of assistance are dealt with in Sections 109 to 115 of the Act.  
Part VI deals with the enforcement of penalties, while Part VII determines the 
procedures for the transit of an individual to the ICC, or how a sentence that has 
been imposed by the ICC upon an individual should be served. The protection of 
national security or third party information is dealt with in Part VIII of the Act, which 
once again closely follows the procedures set out in Article 72 of the Rome Statute. 
Part IX deals with investigations or sittings of the ICC in Kenya, and in the last 
                                                                                                                                       
(b) order that a person shall not be surrendered- 
(i) where criminal proceedings against such person are pending in the Republic, until such 
proceedings are concluded and where such proceedings result in a sentence of a term of 
imprisonment, until such sentence has been served; 
(ii) where such person is serving, or is about to serve a sentence of a term of imprisonment, until such 
sentence has been completed; 
(iii) at all, or before the expiration of a period fixed by the Minister, if he or she is satisfied that by 
reason of the trivial nature of the offence or by reason of the surrender not being required in good 
faith or in the interests of justice, or that for any other reason it would, having regard to the distance, 
the facilities for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, be unjust or unreasonable or 
too severe a punishment to surrender the person concerned; or 
(iv) if he or she is satisfied that the person concerned will be prosecuted or punished or prejudiced at 
his or her trial in the foreign State by reason of his or her gender, race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion. 
249
 Sections 76 to 83 of the Act.  
250
 Sections 84 to 94 of the Act.  
251
 Sections 95 to 107 of the Act. 
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instance, Part X relates to how Kenya should address requests for assistance to the 
ICC.252 
 
4.3.3 The Proposed International Crimes Division of the High Court of Kenya 
In an effort to give effect to the principle of complementarity, the Judicial Service 
Commission appointed a committee on 9 May 2012, with a mandate to investigate 
the modalities for the establishment of an International Crimes Division of the High 
Court (ICD), and furthermore to address all issues relating to the capacity such a 
division would require to operate.253 On 30 October 2012, the committee published 
its report.254 In general the committee made two important findings. Firstly, it rightly 
concluded that in terms of the Rome Statute, each state party should primarily be 
responsible for the prosecution of individuals accused of committing international 
crimes.255 Secondly, in light of the failure by the Kenyan government to establish a 
special tribunal to try perpetrators of post-election violence, the committee 
recommended that the ICD be established.   
The committee recommended that the ICD should have jurisdiction not only to 
prosecute post-election violence cases, but also to prosecute international and 
transnational crimes. The ICD would in theory try core international crimes as per 
Section 6 of the International Crimes Act, and transnational crimes, as well as any 
other international crimes that might be prescribed.256 The ICD would be created 
through a notice in the Government Gazette and would make use of special rules of 
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 Sections 468 to 170 of the Act.  
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 The terms of reference for the report also included research into the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the ICD to also prosecute other international and transnational crimes not proscribed in the 
International Crimes Act. The committee conducted a literature review and carried out comparative 
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 The report can be accessed at: https://www.scribd.com/document/236202990/JSC-Committee-
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 The committee found that Kenya is under an obligation as a state party to cooperate with the ICC 
in the performance of its work through either of the three following means: i) By making use of the 
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most of the crimes committed, ii) By adopting legislation that refers to the relevant provisions of 
international law, treaties and a range of penalties, or iii) The specific criminalisation of the offences 
concerned, where the specific crimes are independently defined in the Criminal Code of Kenya.  
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 Some of the transnational crimes include, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrimes, money 
laundering and even terrorism. The ICD would also have jurisdiction to try any other crimes under an 
international instrument to which Kenya is a party, for instance the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), or piracy which is a crime under customary 
international law.  
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procedure and evidence when conducting trials.257 The committee recommended 
that the ICD should be modelled on the ICC, and that rules and procedures similar to 
those used by the ICC should be adopted. The ICD would consist of seven judges of 
the High Court, with three judges sitting as a court. The judges would receive special 
training in international criminal law. The committee also recommended that the ICD 
be housed in a separate facility due to the sensitive nature of the cases.  
The committee recommended that an independent prosecution unit within the Office 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions be established to exclusively deal with 
international crimes. The committee however then went on to recommend that 
legislation be enacted for the appointment of a special prosecutor, who should be 
responsible for the prosecution of all cases which falls within the jurisdiction of the 
ICD.258 The recommendations seem to be contradictory, but as the ICD has not yet 
been established, the author is of the view that this contradiction will be resolved 
beforehand.  
There is a long road ahead before the ICD can finally be established, and various 
important questions first have to be answered.259 Once established, the ICD will also 
face some challenges that need to be resolved in order to ensure that the court will 
function properly. Some of these challenges will be addressed in paragraph 3.5 
hereunder.  
 
4.3.4 How does Kenya‘s implementation legislation compare to that of South 
Africa‘s? 
The International Crimes Act does not provide for complete universal jurisdiction as 
the South African ICC Act does. Section 4(3) of the ICC Act endows South African 
courts with universal jurisdiction to prosecute a person who commits a core crime 
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 The legislative framework for the creation of the ICD would include the Constitution in which 
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 Recommendation B(2) of the Commission, page 149 of the Report.  
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 Some of the questions include how to guarantee the independence of the ICD and the special 
prosecutor, how to prosecute individuals in terms of the International Crimes Act, if the Act cannot be 
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Service Act.  
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outside the territory of South Africa when that individual is present in South Africa at 
any stage after the commission of those crimes.260 To fully give effect to the 
complementarity regime, implementation legislation should allow for the prosecution 
of core international crimes regardless of the territory in which they have been 
committed. In this regard, Section 8 of the International Crimes Act is lacking, and 
consideration should be given to amending this section.  
 
4.3.5  The challenges identified with the implementation of ICC legislation in Kenya  
4.3.5.1 Non-retroactivity of the International Crimes Act 
One of the general principles of criminal law throughout the world is that of nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia, which basically states that the criminalisation 
of an action and its punishment must pre-exist the actual crime. This is to ensure 
legal certainty. Kenya ratified the Rome Statute on 15 March 2005, and the 
International Crimes Act came into force on 1 January 2009. It therefore means that 
all cases relating to the post-election violence that occurred during the period of 
2007-2008, would not be eligible to be prosecuted under the Act. The JSC 
committee report is of the view that since Kenya ratified the Rome Statute during 
2005, the crimes perpetrated during the post-election violence can be regarded as 
pre-existing crimes, and that the perpetrators should be liable for prosecution under 
the Act.261 The problem with this argument is that at the time of ratification of the 
Rome Statute, Kenya was still a dualist state, which would necessitate that a state 
not only ratifies an international treaty, but also domesticates it through the adoption 
of legislation before it becomes law in that country. A solution would be for the 
International Crimes Act to be amended to allow for the retroactive application of the 
Act to the specific period covering the post-election violence in Kenya. In the matter 
of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
and Another the court had to decide whether the enactment of retrospective 
legislation, which ex post facto deems the law at a particular time to be what it was 
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not, offends against the principle of legality and the rule of law.262 Fabricius J found 
that retrospective laws are permissible, and stated that the test to determine whether 
the retroactive law would be constitutional is the test of whether the legislation was 
reasonable or proportional, when that legislation limits a fundamental right afforded 
to an individual in the Bill of Rights. Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that 
such a limitation is valid only if it is ―reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society”. The court found that 
 ―The amendment adopted by parliament was not arbitrary and therefore not in 
breach of Section 25 (1) of the Constitution. Further, and in any event, the 
amendment was reasonable and justifiable in terms of Section 36 (1) of the 
Constitution‖.263   
4.3.5.2 Lack of political will, capacity shortfalls and funding 
The absence of political willpower to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted is a 
major stumbling block in ensuring positive complementarity.264 This problem 
however does not directly relate to the application of the International Crimes Act, as 
a lack of investigation by the Police and Director of Public Prosecutions ensures that 
there is no justice. The prosecution of international crimes is a specialised field, and 
requires training in the prosecution and adjudication of these matters, and the 
government will have to secure funds for this training, and the operation of the staff 
and court.  
4.3.5.3 Proposed ICD should only deal with core international crimes  
As mentioned above, it is envisioned that the proposed ICD of the High Court should 
also deal with transnational and organised crime. This will however overburden the 
ICD, while the High Court of Kenya is perfectly equipped to fully prosecute these 
crimes at present. The ICD should rather be used to focus on the prosecution of core 
international crimes, and even more specifically, the extensive human rights abuses 
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 A real option for justice? The International Crimes Division of the High Court of Kenya. KPTJ 
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that occurred in the post-election period. Only thereafter should consideration be 
given to expanding the jurisdiction of the ICD to other related crimes.  
 
4.3.6 Conclusion  
The political willpower of a government largely determines whether that country will 
be able to effect positive complementarity. In the case of Kenya, although the 
International Crimes Act seems to provide an adequate legislative framework for the 
prosecution of international crimes, the necessary political drive to do so is severely 
lacking. On 25 October 2015, the International Crimes Repeal Bill was published and 
introduced in parliament. The principal object of the Bill was to repeal the 
International Crimes Act in its entirety as part of a move on the part of Kenyan 
government to withdraw as a state party to the Rome Statute. The bill went through 
the first reading, and then a formal introduction in the House during June 2016. The 
bill however did not pass the second reading, and was left to lapse on a technicality. 
As at September 2017, the government of Kenya has not provided the Secretary-
General of the UN with a written notification in terms of Article 127 of the Rome 
Statute of its intention to withdraw as a state party. It can be argued that the current 
rhetoric is little more than a political ploy to influence the ICC. Nevertheless it is the 
ordinary citizen that will pay the price, should Kenya proceed with their threats to 
withdraw.  
 
4.4 Uganda  
4.4.1 Introduction  
After many years as a British protectorate, Uganda gained independence from 
Britain on 9 October 1962, and became a republic in 1963. Uganda‟s legal system is 
that of English Common Law, complimented by customary law. As in South Africa, 
the Constitution is the supreme law in Uganda, and any legislation that is in conflict 
with the Constitution is null and void.265 Uganda signed the Rome Statute on 17 
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March 1999, and ratified the Statute on 14 June 2002. Since becoming the 68th state 
party, Uganda has enacted legislation to give effect to their commitment to the Rome 
Statute in the form of the International Criminal Court Act 2010, which will be 
discussed in more detail hereunder.266 In 2003, Uganda became the first state party 
since the establishment of the ICC, to refer a situation to the Court, when it asked 
the ICC to investigate crimes allegedly committed by the Lord‟s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in Northern Uganda during 2002.267 Uganda is also unique in that it 
established the International Crimes Division (ICD), a special division of the High 
Court of Uganda during 2008, as part of the Juba Agreement. The purpose of the 
ICD is to prosecute individuals accused of committing crimes noted in The 
International Criminal Court Act 2010, as well as certain other serious crimes such 
as human trafficking, piracy and other international crimes. Uganda also faces some 
obstacles and challenges with regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute, 
which will also be discussed hereunder.  
After the National Resistance Army toppled the government of Milton Obote in 1986, 
President Museveni came to power in Uganda, heralding a fairly peaceful period in 
the country‟s history. However, due to ethnic strife and social inequality between the 
Northern and Southern regions of the country, the Lord‟s Resistance Army, a rebel 
group led by the self-proclaimed prophet and leader Joseph Kony strengthened by 
military support from the government of Sudan started a military offensive leading to 
numerous human rights abuses by both the LRA and the Ugandan military.268   
 
4.4.2 The International Criminal Court Act 2010  
In 2006, the International Criminal Court Bill was introduced in the Ugandan 
Parliament, and on 10 March 2010, the International Criminal Court Act was 
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 The Ugandan International Criminal Court Act 2010, was adopted by the Ugandan Parliament on 
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unanimously adopted.269 The Act came into force on 25 June 2010. The Act makes 
detailed provision for both cooperation and complementarity as stipulated in the 
Rome Statute.270  
 
4.4.2.1 Part II of the Act: International crimes and offences against the administration 
of justice  
Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Act criminalise genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.271 Section 7(1)(b) of the Act also provides for criminalisation of the crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide, thereby establishing individual accountability and 
providing for the punishment thereof by imprisonment for life or any lesser term as 
the court may deem appropriate.272 The Act goes further and also includes the 
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 The first Bill that was introduced to Parliament was in June 2004, however the Bill did however not 
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(b) to implement obligations assumed by Uganda under the Statute; 
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genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
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(i) to enforce any sentence imposed or order made by the ICC‖.  
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 Section 9 of the Act refers to war crimes as they are defined in the 4 Geneva Conventions. Before 
the International Crimes Act came into force, the Geneva Conventions Act that was passed in 1964 
provided for the punishment of grave breaches of the 4 Geneva Conventions.  
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 Section 7 of the Act reads as follows: 
―(1) A person is liable on conviction on indictment to the penalty specified in subsection (3) who, in 
Uganda or elsewhere— 
(a) commits genocide; or 
(b) conspires or agrees with any person to commit genocide, whether that genocide is to take place in 
Uganda or elsewhere. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, ―genocide‖ is an act referred to in article 6 of the Statute. 
(3) The penalty for genocide, or conspiring with, or agreeing with any person to commit genocide is 
imprisonment for life or a lesser term.‖ 
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criminalisation of offences against the administration of justice.273 The Act however 
does not criminalise the crime of aggression, although the Rome Statute as a whole 
is included as a schedule to the Act, wherein Article 5(1)(d) does make provision for 
this. Before the introduction of the Act, Ugandan law did not make provision for any 
crimes against humanity, although some of the acts that constitute crimes against 
humanity could be punished under the Penal Code.274  As with the South African ICC 
Act, section 17 also stipulates that the Director of Public Prosecutions must consent 
before any proceedings may be instituted. The jurisdiction of the courts in Uganda to 
try matters is regulated by Section 18 of the Act.275 The principle of universal 
jurisdiction is therefore incorporated into the Act, providing that the courts have 
jurisdiction to hear a matter, even if the entire crime was committed outside the 
territory of Uganda, as long as the perpetrator is present in Uganda any time after 
the commission of the alleged crime. Previously the Geneva Conventions Act of 
1964 also provided the courts with universal jurisdiction.276  
 
4.4.2.2 Parts III to X of the Act: General provisions relating to requests for 
assistance, arrest and surrender of persons to the ICC, cooperation with the ICC and 
other general provisions  
Part III of the Act deals with provisions relating to requests for assistance by the ICC 
relating to the provisional arrest, and arrest and surrender of suspects to the ICC, as 
well as the taking of evidence and all other related assistance that can be rendered 
by the Ugandan authorities to the ICC. Part V of the Act deal with complementarity in 
that it sets out the procedures for a domestic prosecution of individuals accused of 
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 In this regard see Sections 123, 124, 188 and 189 of the Penal Code.  
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international crimes. Implementation of the Act goes a long way to address the 
current situation. Additional legislation may however be required to enable the 
government to act against the perpetrators of crimes committed before the Act 
commenced, as the Act does not have retroactive working.277   
 
4.4.3 The International Crimes Division of the High Court  
In terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of Uganda, and in putting the Juba peace 
agreement into practice, the International Crimes Division (ICD) was created. The 
ICD is a special division of the High Court,278 created to specifically deal with crimes 
mentioned in the International Criminal Court Act 2010, as well as certain other 
serious crimes that require specialist knowledge to successfully prosecute, including 
terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and other international crimes.279 Although the 
ICD was originally created to give effect to the Juba peace agreement, the ICD is 
seen as a court of complementarity with respect to Uganda‟s obligations as a state 
party to the Rome Statute. According to the ICD‟s mission statement, the ICD was 
created to fight impunity and to promote human rights, peace and justice.280 A further 
important aspect of the ICD‟s work is to promote an image of a strong, independent 
and impartial judiciary. The ICD consists of 5 High Court judges. Appeal against an 
ICD decision can be lodged with the Court of Appeal and with the Supreme Court of 
Uganda.  
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4.4.4 How does Uganda‘s legislation compare to that of South Africa? 
The International Criminal Court Act is a comprehensive and detailed piece of 
legislation signalling Uganda‟s willingness to put a stop to impunity. The Act is 
comparable to that of Kenya, and like South Africa‟s International Criminal Court Act, 
it incorporates the Rome Statute crimes into its national legislation.   
 
4.4.5 Legal challenges facing Uganda with regard to the implementation of the 
Rome Statute 
4.4.5.1 Head of State Immunity  
Section 98(4) of the Constitution of Uganda states that while holding the office of 
President, an individual shall not be liable to proceedings in any court whether they 
be civil or criminal. When one considers that Article 27 of the Rome Statute has not 
been incorporated into the International Crimes Act, and the fact that the Constitution 
takes precedence over any law inconsistent with it, it becomes clear that whilst being 
President, an individual cannot be prosecuted for any crimes provided for in the 
Act.281  Section 25 of the Act does provide that official capacity of a person is no bar 
for either refusing or postponing the execution of a request for surrender or 
assistance made by the ICC. It therefore seems that whilst the head of state cannot 
be prosecuted inside Uganda during his tenure as president, his or her official 
capacity should be no restriction for the Ugandan authorities to cooperate with the 
ICC in surrendering him or her for prosecution in The Hague. This scenario seems 
unlikely though. This lacuna in the Act does however not apply to another country‟s 
head of state, and theoretically the authorities in Uganda should be able to arrest 
and surrender any other head of state that finds him- or herself in their territory at the 
time of a request made by the ICC.  
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4.4.5.2 The Amnesty Act of 2000  
During 2000, the government of Uganda published The Amnesty Act, providing a 
blanket amnesty from prosecution for all individuals who had, since 26 January 
1986, participated in the war or armed rebellion against the government.282 The Act 
initially provided for an amnesty period of six months, which, upon expiry, could be 
extended.283 It is estimated that since its enactment, 13 000 former LRA fighters 
have received pardons.284 Although the amnesty aided in facilitating peace in 
Uganda, it undermines the successful implementation of the International Crimes 
Act, thereby fuelling impunity.285 Many of the crimes perpetrated during the conflict in 
Uganda were war crimes and crimes against humanity. By also granting amnesty to 
senior LRA commanders in an effort to bring an end to the conflict, the government 
failed the victims of the conflict.286 In the matter of Uganda v Thomas Kwoyelo,287 the 
Supreme Court of Uganda, however ruled that the former LRA commander must be 
tried before the ICD, and that his actions were still punishable under Section 147 of 
the Geneva Conventions Act, and Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute.288 This is an 
important judgment, in that to some extent it clarifies the position of individuals that 
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 Section 3 of the Amnesty Act, 2000 provides as follows: 
―(1) An Amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of 
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have not been granted amnesty, but who could not be tried for crimes as stipulated 
in the International Crimes Act.289 
 
4.4.5.3 Non-retroactive application of the International Crimes Act 
As is the case with Kenya‟s International Crimes Act, Uganda‟s International Crimes 
Act also does not make provision for the retroactive application of the Act. Article 
15(2) of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Uganda 
acceded to on 21 June 1995, without making any reservations, states that  
―Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of 
nations‖.  
It can therefore be argued that the International Crimes Act could be amended to 
include the retroactive application of the Act to the conflict, and that such an 
amendment would not be unconstitutional. Article 28(7) of the Constitution however 
states that  
―No person shall be charged with or convicted of a criminal offence which is 
founded on an act or omission that did not at the time it took place constitute a 
criminal offence‖.  
It is the author‟s view that it could be argued that the core international crimes which 
the International Crimes Act seeks to punish were in fact already part of the 
Ugandan law, as the Geneva Conventions Act came into force on 16 October 1964.  
For the time being, perpetrators can be tried by the ICD under the Geneva 
Conventions Act.  
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4.4.6 Conclusion  
The African continent has the potential to be prosperous and peaceful. 
Domesticating the Rome Statute should be given priority and the necessary 
allocation of human and capital resources in order for the ICC to succeed, as the 
primary responsibility to ensure that perpetrators are brought to book lies with the 
state parties to the Rome Statute. In the next and final chapter of the dissertation, 
the main aim of the study will be answered, and recommendations will be made to 
enable African state parties to implement the Rome Statute in a way that would be 
meaningful.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction  
―I firmly believe the international community needs to change the narrative about 
Africa and to establish a higher platform of cooperation that recognizes Africa‘s 
enormous potential and promise. In the area of peace and security, the African 
Union and United Nations have a shared interest in strengthening mechanisms 
to defuse conflicts before they escalate, and to manage them effectively when 
they occur. Enhancing African capacities is essentially both in the context of our 
collective response to international peace and security challenges as well as for 
the self-reliance of the African continent.‖
290 
The aim of this study is to identify the legal challenges faced by Botswana, Kenya 
and Uganda with regard to the implementation of the Rome Statute, and after 
identifying the difficulties faced by these countries to suggest actions that may be 
implemented in order to give effect to complementarity and cooperation by these 
state parties. In the previous two chapters, various implementation issues were 
identified which hinder effective complementarity and cooperation. In some cases it 
is the implementation legislation itself which is lacking in certain areas, therefore 
allowing impunity to continue. In some countries the judicial and prosecutorial 
structures created, which are supposed to be the custodians of the implementation 
legislation, are hampered from giving full effect to the legislation by certain legal 
factors in those countries‟ legal systems. All the critical challenges have been 
identified. In some instances the solutions suggested in this chapter will entail that a 
country‟s constitution be amended. In other cases, a less intrusive solution is 
possible to ensure effective implementation. Lastly, although the study seeks to 
address the legal challenges, it also includes some important subjective factors 
hampering the implementation of the Rome Statute in Africa. In this regard, politics 
plays a major role, and because legislation can, to some extent, be used to exert 
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Security by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr António Guterres on 19 July 2017.  
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political will, it was deemed necessary to include this important factor that has an 
influence on the implementation legislation, or, where legislation has already been 
domesticated the effective application thereof.291  
 
5.2 Answering the main aim of the study 
In the following paragraphs the most critical legal challenges that have been 
identified which are hampering the effective implementation of the Rome Statute will 
be discussed, and solutions proposed.292 The idea is that African state parties who 
have not yet domesticated the Rome Statute may be made aware of certain issues 
and may make use of the knowledge when drafting national legislation or when 
negotiating a cooperation protocol.  
 
5.2.1  Head of state immunity, pardons and amnesty as well as conflicting or 
competing Acts and/or instruments.  
A major challenge identified in the study is that of head of state immunity. A state‟s 
domestic legislation should ensure that their law enforcement authorities and courts 
are able to investigate and prosecute any individual accused of committing 
international human rights abuses, irrespective of their official capacity during or after 
the alleged commitment of those crimes.  As previously discussed in the study, 
immunities in international law have a legitimate and necessary purpose, albeit 
limited.293 The challenge is that customary head of state immunity is used as an 
excuse to bar the prosecution of a sitting head of state of a non-state party for core 
international crimes, as is currently the case with President Al-Bashir.294 It is 
however almost universally accepted that immunity ratione materiae can never be 
invoked when being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal, or even at a 
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 The establishment of jurisdiction by the ICC over a non-state party as is the case in the Darfur 
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domestic level.295 Similarly, immunity ratione personae should automatically be 
removed before an international criminal tribunal, although Akande states that when 
it comes to a domestic prosecution, state practice unanimously dictates that a state 
official possessing immunity ratione personae will not be subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of a foreign state when being accused of committing international 
crimes.296 As mentioned below, the drafters of the Rome Statute opted for a 
compromise when drafting the statute to accommodate as many state parties as 
possible to ensure that the text is adopted. It therefore appears as if the Rome 
Statute has conflicting provisions regarding immunity. Article 27(1) states that ―This 
Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity‖, making functional immunity inapplicable to any individual appearing before 
the ICC. Article 27(2) states that ―Immunities or special procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, 
shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person‖, therefore 
ensuring that personal immunity is redundant before the ICC. Article 98(1) of the 
Rome Statute however states that the ICC cannot proceed with requesting from a 
state party the surrender of an individual or assistance which would require said 
state to ―act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to 
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third state….‖. A ―third 
state” in this context basically refers to a non-state party to the Rome Statute. The 
challenge is for a state party to construct provisions in their domestic legislation to 
ensure that immunity cannot influence their complementarity or cooperation regime. 
A good example on how to construct such a provision is that of Article 6(2) of the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone which states ―The official position of 
any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment‖.  
Pardons and amnesty legislation should not be an impediment to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by domestic courts. Many states, including South Africa, make provision 
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 The Arrest Warrant Case as well as Article 27 of the Rome Statute and Article 7 of the ICTY 
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 Akande D “International law immunities and the International Criminal Court” 2003 American 
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for the president of that country to pardon an individual.297 As head of the executive, 
a president issues a pardon on a purely discretional basis, taking into account 
individual considerations and therefore circumventing judicial proceedings.298 
However, in the matter of President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v 
Hugo, the Constitutional Court held that the act of a presidential pardon would be 
subject to review by courts of appropriate jurisdiction, in the same way as the 
exercise of any other powers granted to the President by the Constitution would be 
subject to review.299 Granting a pardon to a perpetrator of international crimes is not 
consistent with a state‟s complementarity obligations, and should be discouraged. It 
is suggested that national legislation should specifically make provision that no 
pardons should be given to an individual convicted of international crimes.300  
O‟Shea defines amnesty as ―immunity in law from criminal or civil legal 
consequences for wrongs committed in the past in a political context‖.301 The 
granting of amnesty is usually done through an Act of Parliament and is meant to 
prevent any criminal prosecution against an individual as stipulated, in the legislation 
of that country. The rationale behind amnesty is to foster reconciliation between 
previous enemies and to promote the transition to peace in that country. Amnesty 
legislation will always be controversial. In the matter of Azanian Peoples 
Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, the court held that ―…the Constitution authorised and contemplated an 
―amnesty‖ in its most comprehensive and generous meaning so as to enhance and 
optimise the prospects of facilitating the constitutional journey from the shame of the 
past to the promise of the future…‖.302 It is however important to note that the 
amnesty granted to individuals should not be couched in terms that allow for a 
blanket amnesty, and that strict criteria should be met before amnesty is granted. 
Uganda‟s Amnesty Act of 2000 provided a blanket amnesty to all individuals whom 
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participated in the civil conflict in that country, from the conflict‟s inception in January 
1986. This is contrary to the spirit of amnesty legislation and allows for impunity on a 
large scale. Amnesty should not be granted to the perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations.303 In the matter of Julio Simón et al. v. Public Prosecutor,  the Supreme 
Court in Argentina had to decide whether Argentina‟s amnesty laws were 
unconstitutional and contrary to the country‟s international obligations.304 The court 
found that the amnesty laws were in fact unconstitutional and that a state should not 
put in place any legislation that would halter the investigation and/or prosecution of 
serious human rights abuses. Domestic legislation should provide that a state party‟s 
courts are able to exercise universal jurisdiction even where the perpetrator has 
been granted amnesty by another state. This is entirely consistent with the principles 
of international law as well as Article 17(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, which states that 
when a determination has to be made on whether a state is unwilling to prosecute an 
individual due to a decision that was made by a state ―…for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court referred to in Article 5‖, the ICC may then proceed with such a prosecution. 
States should therefore endeavour to avoid granting amnesty to the perpetrators of 
international crimes committed within their territory, or risk intervention in the 
prosecution of such individuals by the ICC or a state party to the Rome Statute who 
is in a position to assert jurisdiction.  
In the last instance, a state should ensure that it is not in a situation where the 
provisions of two Acts or an Act and a Treaty are in direct conflict with each other. An 
example of this situation would be a bilateral immunity agreement between a state 
party and the United States, as is the case with Botswana and Uganda, who both 
have bilateral immunity agreements with the US.305 A state party incurs obligations in 
terms of the Rome Statute, and it is in direct conflict with a state‟s obligations and the 
intention of the Rome Statute to sign a bilateral immunity agreement. The conclusion 
of such an agreement is also in breach of a state‟s obligations under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and might even be in conflict with a state‟s own 
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extradition laws. A state party which concluded a bilateral immunity agreement still 
has to honour their obligations under the Rome Statute, and the agreement merely 
creates a conflict of obligations for that state.306  
 
5.2.2 Jurisdiction of Domestic Courts 
The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty established to put an end to impunity. As is 
the case in most multilateral treaties, the Rome Statute is built on compromise to 
ensure acceptance of the Statute by as many states as possible. The  result is that it 
is up to the domestic implementation legislation of a state party to define and 
formulate legal principles that will ensure the effective prosecution of perpetrators of 
gross human rights abuses. To achieve this, it is of cardinal importance that the 
implementation legislation provides for the full and correct definition of the crimes, 
and for the domestic courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of 
those crimes.  
5.2.2.1 Jurisdiction in terms of the crimes covered by the Implementation Legislation  
It is important to note that crimes under international law are not confined to the 
crimes mentioned in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 8bis of the Rome Statute.307 Domestic 
implementation legislation should also make provision for international crimes listed, 
for instance, under Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions relating to the methods 
and means of warfare, the status of combatants and prisoners-of-war, as well as the 
protection of the civilian population during a conflict.308 It should also include the 
crimes of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions.309 It is 
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important that the definitions of the crimes listed in the implementation legislation 
should be consistent with their definitions in customary international law to ensure 
legal consistency across all state parties. Kenya and Uganda have comprehensive 
implementation legislation that does define the core international crimes as provided 
for in the Rome Statute. So, for instance, Uganda‟s International Criminal Court Act 
incorporates the Rome Statute in its entirety as schedule 1 to the Act, which, as a 
logical consequence, includes the definitions of the crimes listed in Articles 6, 7, 8 
and 8bis of the Rome Statute as well as the Elements of the Crimes Document as 
per Article 9 thereof. Kenya‟s International Crimes Act likewise incorporates the 
Rome Statute as the first schedule to the Act. It however does not make provision for 
any other international crimes, which could have been included in the Act during the 
drafting thereof. Care should however be taken to not merely copy the Rome Statute 
directly into domestic legislation as is currently the tendency amongst state parties, 
as it might cause a conflict with existing national legislation.310 
 
5.2.2.2 Universal / Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
The preamble to the Rome Statute notes that the “most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole” must be punished by the state parties on a 
domestic level and that it is the duty of each State to “exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction‖ over the perpetrators of those crimes. The jurisdiction of a state party 
should therefore not be limited to its territory, but should extend over crimes 
wherever they may have been committed, and without reference to the nationality of 
the perpetrator or the victims.311 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a very important 
principle that must be included in the domestic legislation of a state party. Article 12 
of the Rome Statute limits the ICC‟s jurisdiction,312 and it is up to the national 
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legislation to ensure that there are no safe havens created for the perpetrators of 
these crimes. Although universal jurisdiction is not a novel concept, most states even 
after they became state parties to the Rome Statute only opted for a limited 
application of universal jurisdiction, in that the presence of the perpetrator in the 
state carrying out the investigation and prosecution is required.313 Most countries 
however now accept that universal jurisdiction in absentia, where there is no link 
between the state prosecuting the perpetrator and the individual accused of 
committing the international crimes, is acceptable.314 
If a state party is not able to prosecute a perpetrator when located within their 
territory or jurisdiction that state should at the very least extradite the individual to the 
ICC or a state party that can exercise universal jurisdiction.315  The best solution is to 
ensure that a state‟s domestic legislation comprehensively provides for the 
application of universal jurisdiction, not only for the investigation of atrocities, but 
also for the effective prosecution thereof.  
 
5.2.3 Non-retroactivity of the Implementation Legislation  
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege guards against the 
retroactivity of criminal laws and ensures legal certainty.316 However, crimes such as 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity were r recognised as core 
international crimes even before they were codified in instruments such as the Rome 
Statute or the Geneva Conventions. The rationale behind this is that 
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abovementioned crimes are considered crimes under the general principles of law 
recognised by the international community.317 As such these ius cogens crimes 
should be punishable even though domestic legislation might not have been enacted 
when the crimes were being perpetrated. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this paper, 
neither Kenya nor Uganda‟s legislation provides for this scenario, which is 
regrettable, as, once again it allows for impunity.318 Kenya‟s International Crimes Act 
can however be amended to include conduct constituting international crimes that 
took place during the post-election violence in 2007/2008, at the time when the Act 
was not yet adopted. This would not be unconstitutional.319 Furthermore Article 15(2) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly states that the 
principle of the prohibition of retroactivity should not ―…prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations‖. A state should therefore ensure that detailed provisos are 
made in an implementation act to allow for the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes constituting international crimes at the time they were committed, even when 
no national legislation was in place prohibiting such conduct.320  
 
5.2.4 The ICC‘s jurisdiction over a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, and 
the political fallout  
In Chapter 3 of the study, certain political challenges hindering the effective 
implementation of the Rome Statute amongst African states were identified and 
discussed. The crux of the discontent seems to be the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
ICC over a national, and for that matter a sitting head of state, of a country which is 
not a state party to the Rome Statute. The only way in which the ICC is able to do 
so, is when the UN Security Council refers a situation to the Court. As mentioned 
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previously, all resolutions taken by the Security Council are binding on all member 
states, irrespective of whether they are state parties or not. Due to the political 
nature of the composition of the Security Council, the AU is of the view that the 
decision taken in Resolution 1593, combined with the Security Council‟s refusal to 
defer the situation in Darfur in terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, has resulted 
in the Security Council unfairly targeting African leaders for prosecution by the ICC. 
This situation can be avoided if African state parties practice proactive 
complementarity by investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of international 
crimes irrespective of their status. The ICC is a court of last resort, and a referral of a 
situation to the ICC by the UN Security Council should alert state parties to the fact 
that there is something amiss with regards to the complementarity regime, whether 
that is due to the inability of a state party to prosecute the individual, or due to their 
unwillingness to do so on account of political reasons.  
 
5.3 Standardising implementation legislation as a solution, and the creation 
of a multilateral cooperation protocol between African state parties  
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 of the study, very early on the SADC member 
states created a so-called “Model Enabling Act” and “Ratification Kit” for the Rome 
Statute, which could be used by the SADC states in the ratification of the Rome 
Statute and in the adoption of implementation legislation into their domestic legal 
systems.321 In Europe there are also multilateral initiatives aimed at enhancing a 
state party‟s capacity to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes by creating a 
convention on mutual legal assistance in this regard.322 Most implementation 
legislation by African state parties is currently still in the form of draft legislation.323 In 
cases where there is no formal domestic legislation in place, a state party will have 
to cooperate with the ICC on an ad hoc basis, which is not always ideal.  
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A Model Implementation Act will have many advantages for state parties, and will 
definitely aid interstate cooperation between them. A wide range of crimes can be 
included in such an Act. This will ensure that states all have the same definitions of 
crimes which in turn will be consistent with the definitions of those crimes found in 
international instruments such as the Hague conventions and various other 
conventions. This will also ensure that domestic courts are in a position to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over the crimes as well as avoid the principle of non bis in idem, 
where a perpetrator might, on a technicality, claim that he has already been either 
convicted or acquitted of the charges by another court.  A challenge in this regard is 
the differences between the domestic legal systems of countries, and also the way in 
which countries give effect to their international legal obligations.324 A model 
implementation act will to some extent also be a compromise in order to 
accommodate all the state parties. A Model Implementation Act‟s benefits will 
outweigh the difficulties faced by the state parties in creating such an Act.  
In many African state parties the death penalty can still be imposed. Each domestic 
criminal tribunal or court also has a large discretion when it comes to the sentencing 
of an individual. It is generally accepted in international law that it is inappropriate for 
a domestic court to impose a sentence which is more severe for an international 
crime, than one chosen by the international community itself.325 In most countries 
around the world the death penalty has long since been abolished.326 Article 77(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute states that subject to Article 110, the ICC may either 
impose a sentence for a specific number of years, not exceeding 30 years, or, in the 
case of grave crimes, and taking into account the individual circumstances of the 
perpetrator, life imprisonment.327 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights further prohibits any form of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. A 
Model Implementation Act should include appropriate sentences in line with 
international practices, which must be imposed by all parties, taking into 
consideration the individual circumstances of each perpetrator. Once again this will 
ensure uniformity in the application of justice.  
Most states rely on treaties to regulate interstate cooperation for the provision of 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, or the extradition of a fugitive. In this 
regard the SADC member states have adopted protocols to facilitate cooperation.328 
This allows for fast and efficient interstate cooperation, even though the domestic 
legal systems and legislation of the member states may differ from each other. The 
SADC protocols can serve as an example of how states cooperate with each other 
on a multilateral level regarding their obligations as state parties. The AU has a very 
important role to play in this regard, and a treaty binding all AU state parties to 
provide mutual legal assistance to each other regarding international crimes will go a 
long way to stem the current tide of impunity on the continent. This will encourage 
proactive complementarity among AU member states and will eliminate most of the 
practical difficulties experienced by states when it comes to interstate cooperation. It 
will also ensure that a case is not compromised should it eventually be prosecuted 
by the ICC.329 It will also assist member states to assert jurisdiction in the instance 
where another member state is not able to prosecute a perpetrator due to civil war, 
the collapse of local law enforcement authorities and courts, or simply due to a lack 
of local expertise in the field of prosecuting international crimes.  
On the Third of December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 3074 (XXVII). Clause 3 of the Resolution provides for interstate 
cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis to stop and prevent war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.330 The clauses of this resolution can be incorporated into a 
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protocol to form the basis of cooperation between states. It would also facilitate the 
exchange of legal expertise and enhance technical competency as well as 
strengthening the rule of law.331  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, state parties to the Rome Statute are in a powerful position to promote 
peace and to end impunity, not only in Africa, but across the world. This can only be 
achieved through a strict complementarity regime where national authorities and 
their judicial counterparts through the use of implementation legislation and protocols 
on interstate cooperation investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of these 
heinous crimes.  African state parties should work together closely to formulate a 
plan for the drafting of a Model Implementation Act and an interstate cooperation 
protocol aimed at providing fast and efficient assistance to each other when dealing 
with the perpetrators of international crimes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis with a view to halting and 
preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international 
measures necessary for that purpose”. Resolutions by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
are however not binding on member states as per Articles 10 and 14 of the United Nations Charter.  
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